

Epistemic Accuracy and Subjective Probability

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De Finetti suggested that scoring rules - namely, loss functions by which a forecaster is virtually charged depending on the degree of inaccuracy of his predictions - could be employed also to provide a compelling argument for probabilism. However, De Finetti's choice of a specific scoring rule for this purpose (Brier's quadratic rule) appears somewhat arbitrary, and the general pragmatic flavour of the argument - which makes it a variant of the well-known "Dutch Book Theorem" - has been deemed unsuitable for an epistemic justification of probabilism. In this paper we suggest how Brier's rule may be justified on epistemic grounds by means of a strategy that is different from the one usually adopted for this purpose (e.g., in Joyce 1998), taking advantage of a recent characterization result concerning distance functions between real-valued vectors (D'Agostino and Dardanoni 2009).

References

- D'Agostino M, Dardanoni V (2009) What's so special about Euclidean distance? A characterization result with applications to mobility and spatial voting. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 33 (2): 211-233;
- Joyce JM (1998) A non-pragmatic vindication of probabilism. *Philosophy of Science* 65(4):575-603.