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FROM ATHENS TO BUHĀRĀ, TO CORDOBA, TO COLOGNE:
ON THE TRANSMISSION OF ARISTOTLE'S *METAPHYSICS*
IN THE ARAB AND LATIN WORLDS DURING THE MIDDLE AGES

The historical period taken into account in the present article starts in a Greek island and ends in a German cloister. The island is Assos, where Aristotle began his philosophical teaching and probably gave the first lectures named afterwards "Metaphysics". The cloister is the Dominican convent in Würzburg, where Albertus Magnus (d. 1280) wrote his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, after having commented on all the Aristotelian *corpus*. More than a millenium and half separates the island from the cloister. The temporal line connecting Assos with Würzburg is geographically centered around the Mediterranean Sea, which it surrounds in several directions: first Eastward, from Athens, via Alexandria of Egypt and Baghdad, until Persia and Transoxania, where Avicenna (d. 1037) was born; then Westward, from the Middle East, through North Africa and Maghreb, until Islamic Spain or Andalusia, Averroes' (d. 1198) homeland; finally Northward, from the Iberian peninsula in the direction of England, France and Germany. This itinerary passes through and connects four different cultures and languages (Greek, Arabic, Jewish and Latin), with distinct religious traditions. During the journey, the format of the work under consideration changes radically: the notes of Aristotle's lectures become, first, a book in its own right; then a depository of doctrines to be coherently reorganized and reshaped (Avicenna); then the object of one of the most extensive commentaries ever written on a work of ancient philosophy (Averroes); finally, the basic element of a comprehensive synthesis, in which the previous exegetical tradition is added to, and integrated in, a paraphrase of Aristotle's text (Albertus Magnus). At the end, the initial hundred pages of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (according to Bekker's edition) have grown up and expanded into the six hundred pages of Albertus' commentary.

The itinerary taken into account here consists of four main stages: the series of events regarding the composition of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (Aristotle's lectures thereupon; the fixing and diffusion of the text in its actual form; its Greek exegesis); the "reform" of this work by Avicenna; its "reassessment", by means of a comprehensive exegesis, by Averroes; its multi-layers presentation, massively dependent on the Arabic interpretation, by Albertus Magnus. For the sake of convenience, these four stages will be labelled according to the cities traditionally associated with the

names of their protagonists, namely Athens, Buḡārā, Cordoba and Cologne. In what follows, after some brief notations on the starting-point of the journey in Athens, the attention will focus on the following three stages.

Athens

Although it seems that Aristotle started lecturing on metaphysical topics in Assos (348/7-345/4), he certainly resumed this teaching in Athens (335/4-323/2), where he returned after having supervised Alexander the Great's education in Macedonia¹. In Athens – where he founded the Lyceum and remained twelve or thirteen years, until a few months before his death (322/1) – he probably also composed and grouped together some treatises of the *Metaphysics*². Knowledge of Aristotle's philosophy is attested outside the Greek peninsula in the following centuries³. Again with Athens, however, is linked the name of the next main character of our story. In this city was active during the 1st century BC Andronicus of Rhodes⁴, to whom we owe the standard "edition" of Aristotle's works – i.e. the arrangement and publication of all the extant writings of Aristotle according to a precise classification of the parts of philosophy – and probably also the title of the work "Metaphysics"⁵. Related to Athens, finally, for having taught or studied there, are the

¹ The historical sources report that, after Plato's death (348/7), Aristotle taught in Assos in the school of some former co-students in the Academy. He probably gave lectures on metaphysics also later in Mytilene of Lesbos, where he directed a school of his own for a short period of time (345/4-343/2). The dating of Aristotle's life adopted here is that reported by Apollodorus of Athens (see B. Fucini, "Aristotele di Stagira. Prosopographie, Chronologie", in *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, ed. R. Goulet, vol. I, CNRS Éditions, Paris 1989, pp. 417-418). Scholars, however, do not unanimously interpret the details of Apollodorus' chronology, and propose slightly different datings of Aristotle's biography (see, for example, Aristotele, *Metafisica. Testo greco a fronte*, a cura di G. Reale, Bompiani, Milano 2000, pp. xxxv-xxxvii).

² See Aristotele, *Metafisica. Testo greco a fronte*, a cura di G. Reale cit., p. vii.

³ According to some sources, in the first half of the 3rd century BC all the Aristotelian books available in Athens, Skepsis and Rhodes were transferred to Alexandria by the king Ptolemy Philadelphus (308-246 BC). On these reports, see the entry "Aristotele di Stagira. L'œuvre d'Aristotele. Histoire du texte et tradition manuscrite", in *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, ed. R. Goulet, vol. I, CNRS Éditions, Paris 1989, pp. 434-435; H. J. Drossart Luofs, "Naleus of Scepsis and the Fate of the Library of the Peripatetics", in *Tradition et traditionnisme. Les textes philosophiques et scientifiques grecs au Moyen Âge latin. Hommage à Ferdinand Bossier*, ed. R. Beyers, J. Brama, D. Sacré, K. Verrycken, Leuven University Press, Leuven 1999, pp. 9-24, pp. 20-22.

⁴ On Andronicus of Rhodes, see R. Goulet, "Andronicus de Rhodes", in *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, ed. R. Goulet, vol. I, CNRS Éditions, Paris 1989, pp. 200-202.

⁵ Partial editions of the work that Andronicus called afterwards "Metaphysics" apparently existed before the 1st century BC, since the time of the very first disciples of Aristotle. E. Zeller, W. D. Ross and P. Moraux, for example, regard as substantially true the report according to which Eudemus of Rhodes produced a version of the *Metaphysics* identical or similar to the one "edited" by Andronicus (see M. Naucy, "Aristotele di Stagira. La *Metafisica*. Tradizione Greca. Origine et titre", in *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, dir. par R. Goulet, Supplement, CNRS Éditions, Paris 2003, pp. 227-228). More disputed is the issue of whether the "Metaphysics" (apparently in ten books), mentioned in the catalogue of Aristotle's works that occurs at the end of the life of Aristotle commonly called *Vita Hevelii*, depends or not on a source earlier than Andronicus (for contrasting views on this issue, see the entry "Aristotele di Stagira. L'œuvre d'Aristotele. Les listes des ouvrages d'Aristotele", in *Dictionnaire des*

authors of the three commentaries on the *Metaphysics* extant in Greek that antedate the rise of Islam: Alexander of Aphrodisias (beginning of the 3rd century), Syrianus (beginning of the 5th century), and Ammonius son of Hermias, in the *reportatio* of the disciple Asclepius (5th-6th century)⁶.

Buḡārā

The village in which Ibn Sīnā (the Latin Avicenna) was born around 980, in the vicinity of Buḡārā in nowadays Uzbekistan, is some thousands miles far from Athens. In this area at the time of Avicenna, after the massive and far-reaching translation movement of philosophy and science from Greek into Arabic, Greek culture was widely circulating. Avicenna himself in the autobiography portrays the library of the sultan of Buḡārā, which he had the chance to visit for a few months when he was about eighteen years old, as the richest collection of books he had ever seen in his life⁷.

The crucial importance that Avicenna ascribed to metaphysics, among the theoretical sciences and in the overall system of philosophy, is evident in many respects. First of all, this discipline is a stable element of all his numerous comprehensive treatments of philosophy (*summae* of the received philosophical *corpus*, literal commentaries thereupon, annotations, school discussions etc.), where it plays the role of crowning discipline of the overall pyramid of knowledge or, conversely, of first, primary, and fundamental branch of theoretical philosophy. Second, he dealt with metaphysics in these works according to a multiplicity of styles (taxonomy in the classifications of the sciences; original reworking in the *summae*; literal exegesis in the commentaries; marginal remark in the annotations; dialogue in the discussions with students; anecdote in the autobiography, etc.), whose variety is indicative of the different audiences to which they are addressed. Third, he paid constant atten-

Philosophes Antiques, ed. R. Goulet, vol. I, CNRS Éditions, Paris 1989, pp. 424-434; M. Naucy, "Aristotele di Stagira. La *Metafisica*. Tradizione Greca. Origine et titre", cit., pp. 224-227). The title "Metaphysics" signifies either that the discipline called in this way is grouped together with physics in a three-fold classification of philosophy in logic, physics and ethics, or that it follows physics in the order of human knowledge. The arguments advanced by P. Moraux to date the origin of the title "Metaphysics" before Andronicus are rejected by M. Naucy, "Aristotele di Stagira. La *Metafisica*. Tradizione Greca. Origine et titre", cit., pp. 224-226. In the colophon of Themistrius (so-called) *Metaphisica*, the expression *perit rē theōratā* is included in the title of the metaphysical section of Nicholas of Damascus (1st century BC) summary of Aristotle's philosophy; this does not imply, however, that the expression was used by Nicholas himself.

⁶ The remaining commentary, by Themistrius (4th century), was written in Constantinople. See C. Luna, "Les commentaires grecs à la *Metafisique*", in *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques*, dir. par R. Goulet, Supplement, CNRS Éditions, Paris 2003, pp. 249-258.

⁷ On the cultural profile of the cities visited by Avicenna during his life, see A. Bertolacci, "Avicenna e la sua epoca: Biblioteche e centri di cultura nell'Oriente musulmano tra il X e l'XI secolo", in *Storia della Filosofia nell'Islam Medievale*, ed. C. D'Ancona Costa, Einaudi, Torino, 2005, pp. 495-521, with further bibliography on Avicenna's life, works and historical context.

tion to this branch of philosophy throughout his life, so that his metaphysical thought underwent a significant evolution, in terms of his attitude towards the canonical text on metaphysics (Aristotle's *Metaphysics*), the formulation of specific doctrines, and the overall view and presentation of metaphysics as a discipline. Finally, in the *summae* and the original treatises he submitted Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, as well as the subsequent speculation on this work, to a revision that is much more profound and radical than in the case of the other parts of the transmitted corpus.

The literary genre most typical of Avicenna's immense philosophical output is certainly the *summa*, of which he can be considered the initiator. Among Avicenna's *summae*, the most important, extensive and detailed is certainly the *Kitāb al-Sifā' (Book of the Cure)*, written *in itinere* between 1020 and 1027⁸. The *Sifā'* is a sort of encyclopedia including logic, the three branches of theoretical philosophy (namely natural philosophy, mathematics and metaphysics) and, as an appendix, practical philosophy. The metaphysical section of the *Sifā'*, the *Ilāhiyyāt* or *Science of Divine Things*, represents Avicenna's masterpiece on metaphysics. The *Ilāhiyyāt* is neither a commentary, nor a paraphrase, and not even a summary of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: it is rather an original treatise, in which Avicenna transforms Aristotle's work into a markedly different system of metaphysics, taking into account, besides Aristotle's text, also all the available subsequent metaphysical speculation. The result is an extremely powerful synthesis, whose "spirit" is Aristotelian, but whose "letter" is genuinely Avicennian⁹. In the *Ilāhiyyāt*, Avicenna operates a thorough recasting of the epistemology and content of the *Metaphysics*, with the aim of replacing Aristotle's work with a full-fledged original elaboration in which metaphysics may finally receive a complete, coherent and rigorous treatment, thus starting to be properly a science. This reworking invests all the main aspects of the epistemological profile of metaphysics (theme, structure, method, relationship with other sciences), and is performed by arranging in a different framework a selection of Aristotle's metaphysical doctrines, to which the views of the Peripatetic commentators, Neoplatonic theories regarded as Aristotelian, and Avicenna's own ideas are added, paying

considerable attention also to the philosophical underpinnings of Islamic religion and to the opinions of muslim theology having philosophical relevance. In so far as it is a comprehensive treatise of metaphysics in which the "raw" material of the *Metaphysics* is refined, expanded, and rebuilt according to a precise epistemology (that of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*), the *Ilāhiyyāt* can be regarded as a second "edition" or second "beginning" of Aristotelian metaphysics in Western philosophy.

Avicenna's reworking of the *Metaphysics* in the *Ilāhiyyāt* is outlined in Table 1. Two radical aspects of innovation are noteworthy. Avicenna changes, first, the "form", i.e. the scientific profile, of the *Metaphysics* (point A). Accordingly, he modifies also its "content", namely the disposition and doctrinal purport of the single books (point B). The changes regarding the "form" affect four main areas: the theme of metaphysics, its structure, its method, and its relationship with the other sciences. The content of the *Metaphysics*, on the other hand, is reworked by means of a different arrangement of its books and by its integration with the subsequent metaphysical speculation, both Greek and Arabic.

Avicenna shows that the theme of metaphysics corresponds coherently to all the different ways according to which Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* portrays this discipline. Thus, metaphysics is a study of the First Causes and God, since the First Causes and God are its "goal". But it is also a study of "existent", since "existent *qua* existent" is its subject-matter. Finally, it is a study of immaterial and motionless things, since both the First Causes and God, on the one hand, and "existent *qua* existent", on the other, are realities of this kind.

As to the new structure that metaphysics receives in the *Ilāhiyyāt*, it is the result of two vertical axes, which intersect with three horizontal layers. The vertical axes are the study of "existent *qua* existent" and the study of "one *qua* one", called in the table, respectively, Ontology and Henology. The horizontal layers are given by the species, properties and causes of "existent" and "one". Ontology is the first and main axis, since it concerns the subject-matter of metaphysics: it displays a three-fold distinction in species, properties and causes of "existent", according to which metaphysics rests primarily on a sequence of three parts (OntologyS, OntologyP and OntologyC). OntologyC is also a Theology, since the first cause of "existent" is God. Henology is a complementary and shorter axis: it encompasses a treatment of the species of "one" and "many" (HenologyS), and an analysis of their properties (HenologyP). The culmination of metaphysics is OntologyC/Theology, which Avicenna portrays as the "seal" of this discipline.

In comparison with Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the method of the *Ilāhiyyāt* is both more apodictic (i.e. more dependent on rigorous proofs like demonstrations) and, conversely, less dialectical. On the one hand, Avicenna clarifies the status and limits of metaphysics as a demonstrative science, reworks the arguments of Aristotle's writing in syllogistic form, and pays considerable attention to the truth and certainty of the premises of arguments. In the same vein, he complements the recourse to demonstrations with procedures that we can call "analytical", like proofs by division.

⁸ Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Sifā' al-Ilāhiyyāt* (1), ed. Ġ. S. Qanawātī, S. Zāyid, al-Hay' al-ʿilmīya li-ṣūʿn al-maʿābīʿ al-amīriyya, Cairo 1960; *Al-Sifā' al-Ilāhiyyāt* (2), ed. M. Y. Mūsā, S. Dūnyā, S. Zāyid, al-Hay' al-ʿilmīya li-ṣūʿn al-maʿābīʿ al-amīriyya, Cairo 1960. Latin translation: *Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina*, I-IV, Edition critique par S. Van Riet, Introduction par G. Verbeke, Peeters-Brill, Louvain-La-Neuve-Leiden 1977; *Liber de Philosophia prima sive Scientia divina*, I-X, Lexiques par S. Van Riet, Peeters-Brill, Louvain-La-Neuve-Leiden 1983. For an overview of the Modern European translations, see *Libro della Guarigione. Le Cune D'oro di Avicenna* (Ibn Sīnā), a cura di A. Bertolacci, pp. 129-130. Avicenna started the *Sifā'* (the part of it including the *Ilāhiyyāt*) in Hamaḡān in 1020 and completed it in Iṣfahān in 1027 (see D. Guenz, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*, Brill, Leiden-New York-Kobenhavn-Keln 1988 pp. 103-106).

⁹ On the thorough transformation that Aristotle's *Metaphysics* undergoes in Avicenna's *Ilāhiyyāt*, see A. Bertolacci, *The Reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics in Avicenna's Kitāb al-Sifā': A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought*, Brill, Leiden (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, 63), 2006.

Table 1: Outline of Avicenna's *Ilāhiyyāt*

Avicenna, <i>Ilāhiyyāt</i>		Sources
(A) FORM:		
(1) Theme: existent is the subject-matter; God and the ultimate causes are the goal; existent and God are immaterial realities		— Aristotle, <i>Posterior Analytics</i> , <i>Metaph.</i> Γ, 1-2; E, 1
(2) Structure:		— Alexander of Aphrodisias, <i>Commentary on Metaph.</i> A
— Ontology	Henology	— Al-Fārābī, <i>On the Goals of Aristotle's Metaphysics</i> (= Ammonius Son of Hermias)
— Species of existent (OntologyS)	Species of one-many (HenologyS)	
— Properties of existent (OntologyP)	Properties of one-many (HenologyP)	
— Causes of existent (OntologyC/Theology)		
(3) Method: apodictic, analytical, non-dialectical		
(4) Relationship with other sciences: metaphysics grounds the proper principles of logic, natural philosophy and mathematics		
(B) CONTENT:		
(i) Prolegomena (I, 1-4): subject-matter, goal, utility, rank, name and division of metaphysics. Introduction (I, 5-8): existent and the other primary concepts; Necessary Existent in itself/possible existent in itself; the axioms		— <i>Metaph.</i> Γ and E, 1 Greek Prolegomena — al-Fārābī, <i>Survey of the Sciences</i>
(ii) OntologyS (II-III): categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation) OntologyP (IV-VI): prior and posterior, potency and act, perfect and imperfect, whole and part; universal and particular; cause and effect		— <i>Metaph.</i> Z-H, Θ
(iii) HenologyS (III, 2-6; III, 9): one by accident and one by essence (by genus, by species = by differentia, by relation, by subject, by number); quantity; absolute and relative multiplicity; opposition one-many; qualities which are in quantities HenologyP (VII, 1): sameness by accident (similarity, equality, comparability), sameness by essence (in genus, species and properties); otherness, alterity, difference, privation and contrariety		— <i>Metaph.</i> I
Appendix to Henology (VII, 2-3): exposition and criticism of the doctrine of numbers of Plato and the Pythagoreans		— <i>Metaph.</i> A-M, N
(iv) OntologyC/Theology (VIII-X, 3): the First Principle's existence; His nature; Cosmology; Theodicy; Eschatology; Prophecy		— <i>Metaph.</i> α, 2 and Λ, 6-10 (= al-Kindī) — Alexander of Aphrodisias, <i>On the Principles of the Universe</i> — Themistius, <i>Commentary on Metaph.</i> A — <i>Theologia Aristotelis. Liber de Causis</i> — Fārābī, <i>Principles of the Opinions of the People of the Best City</i> — Islamic religion and theology

terminological distinctions and classifications. On the other hand, he endeavours to reduce the importance and visibility of the dialectical procedures adopted by Aristotle. Thus, he places the doxographies of books A, M and N in an appendix to Henology, rather than at the beginning and at the end of the work as in the *Metaphysics*, and quotes only a few aporias of book B in different places of the *Ilāhiyyāt*, always connecting them with their solution.

More coherently and systematically than in Aristotle, metaphysics, according to Avicenna, is the apex of the system of sciences. In Avicenna's classification of the sciences, and in its concrete realization in the *Šifā'*, metaphysics functions as a *regina scientiarum* that ascertains the principles of all the other sciences, which therefore result not simply interconnected, but also hierarchically ordered. The scientific principles assessed by metaphysics are, on the one hand, the logical laws common to all the sciences (the axioms), and the universal concepts that every science uses without discussing them (the primary concepts like "existent", "thing", "necessary", "one"). On the other hand, metaphysics clarifies the principles that are proper to each of the sciences and regard their specific subject-matters, i.e. the epistemological hypotheses of the distinct sciences. Thus, metaphysics proves the very existence and the mode of existence of the subject-matters of the other sciences (like the existence and way of existence of universals and categories with regard to logic, of matter and form with regard to natural philosophy, of discrete and continuous quantity with regard to mathematics). Metaphysics provides this foundation primarily and directly to the three branches of theoretical philosophy (logic, natural philosophy, and mathematics), indirectly to the disciplines subordinated to these latter (the foundation of practical philosophy lies in the discussion of prophecy at the end of OntologyC).

Considered collectively, the quotations of the *Metaphysics* in the *Ilāhiyyāt* (taken from various Arabic translations of Aristotle's work, and corresponding to different techniques) show both an extensive use of this work and a radical recasting of its content. Avicenna quotes, in different ways, all the books of the *Metaphysics* (apart, perhaps, from K), but according to an order that is strikingly different from their original disposition in Aristotle's work. Thus, book A is quoted by Avicenna not at the beginning of the *Ilāhiyyāt*, but at the end of Henology. Chapters 1-2 of book α are transferred even "further", namely to OntologyC/Theology, in conjunction with chapters 6-10 of book Λ. The fate of book Γ is opposite: it is not "postponed", but rather placed in the forefront of the *Ilāhiyyāt* (Prolegomena and Introduction). Chapter 1 of book E inspires, together with book Γ in its entirety, some themes of the Prolegomena. Chapters E, 2-4, on the contrary, lay in the background of some minor points of the Introduction and OntologyS. The doctrine of book Z (and, to a lesser extent, of book H) is used in the treatment of substance in OntologyS, in the treatment of the universals in OntologyP, and in the treatment of material and formal causes, still in OntologyP. A comprehensive summary of book Θ occurs in the analysis of potentiality and actuality within OntologyP. Book I is the main

source of HenologyP. Chapters 6-10 of book Γ are quoted, as the continuation of α, 1-2, within OntologyC/Theology. Books M and N, finally, are quoted together with book A at the end of Henology. Other books of the *Metaphysics*, rather than differently ordered, are "scattered". Thus, Avicenna refers to some aporias of book B in distinct places of the Introduction, OntologyP, and OntologyC/Theology. Likewise, several terminological distinctions deriving from book Δ serve (sometimes with critical remarks) as linguistic preliminaries to the treatment of various issues in all the parts of the *Ilāhiyyāt* preceding OntologyC/Theology (Prolegomena, Introduction, OntologyS-HenologyS, OntologyP and HenologyP). In general terms, we can say that Avicenna's reworking of the content of the *Metaphysics* consists in enucleating three main "poles" around which the books of this work can be grouped: the epistemological pole (Prolegomena and Introduction), given by books Γ and E, 1; the ontological-henological pole (OntologyS-P and HenologyS-P), constituted primarily by Z-H, Θ and I, in which B plays a "trouble-shooting" role, Δ provides the semantic preliminaries to the discussion, and A-M-N serve as a doxographical complement; and the theological pole (OntologyC/Theology) constituted by α, 2 and Λ, 6-10.

Avicenna's reshaping of the epistemological profile of the *Metaphysics* derives from three main sources: first, the Aristotelian *corpus* (the model of science presented in *Posterior Analytics* and *Metaphysics* Γ and E, 1, above all); second, the Greek commentators of Aristotle (especially Alexander of Aphrodisias); third, the Arab interpreters of Aristotle (in *primis* al-Fārābī, who might depend in this, not only on Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, whom he quotes, but also on a lost essay by Ammonius Son of Hermeias on the goals of Aristotle's works, lost in Greek but mentioned by Arabic sources). OntologyC/Theology is the section of the work in which the integration of non-Aristotelian material in the content of the metaphysics is more clearly visible. Thus, the connection of chapter α, 2 with chapters Λ, 6-10 within this section derives ultimately from al-Kindī's way of understanding the content of the *Metaphysics*. Moreover, OntologyC/Theology is expanded by means of Alexander of Aphrodisias' and Themistius' works on metaphysics, pseudo-Aristotelian, in fact Neoplatonic, metaphysical works (*Theologia Aristotelis* and *Liber de Causis*), and the theological sections of some original works by al-Fārābī. Finally, in the examples, terminology, themes and opinions of OntologyC/Theology, an attempt to show the affinity of metaphysics with Islamic religion is detectable.

By being an updated, comprehensive and straightforward version of all the previous metaphysical speculation, the *Ilāhiyyāt* had an enormous success in the Arab world, where it soon replaced Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. But its influence rapidly spread also outside Arabic culture: it is the only metaphysical work of Avicenna that was translated into Latin during the Middle Ages. Its Latin translation was made possible in Andalusia by a remarkable interaction of Arabic, Hebrew and Latin cultures, and Muslim, Jewish and Christian religions: it was accomplished in Toledo, promoted by a Jewish scholar writing in Hebrew on theological themes

(Abraham Ibn Dawd), with the assistance of a Christian diacon, author of Latin translations and original works (Dominicus Gundissalinus), under the protection and support of the bishop of Toledo¹⁰. Ibn Dawd moved to Toledo from Córdoba, his native town, where Averroes a few decades later wrote most of his commentaries on Aristotle. Córdoba is the next stop of our journey.

Córdoba

Averroes' *Tafsīr mā ba'd al-ṭabī'ā* (*Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*) is, both stylistically and doctrinally, the counter-part of Avicenna's *Ilāhiyyāt*¹¹. Of Averroes' three commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, it is by far the most comprehensive and detailed, being much more faithful to Aristotle's text than the *Epitome*, and much more extensive and articulated than the *Middle Commentary*. Its historical importance is evident: since all the previous commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, both Greek and Arabic, are incompletely preserved, the *Tafsīr* represents the first extant overall (although not complete) exegesis of Aristotle's work in the Peripatetic tradition¹². On the methodological side, its aim is to resume the exegetical technique of the Greek ancient tradition, namely the literal commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias and, to a lesser extent, the paraphrase of Themistius, two authors whose exegesis of *Metaph.* A Averroes abundantly quotes in his commentary thereupon. On their footsteps, Averroes provides a punctual and continuous explanation of the text of the *Metaphysics*, with frequent references to the other Aristotelian works, according to a model of "holistic" interpretation of the *Metaphysics* and of its role within the *corpus*. On the doctrinal side, its goal is to preserve the original pattern and content of the *Metaphysics* against the modifications and – in Averroes' eyes – "corruptions" introduced by modern philosophers, in *primis* Avicenna. From this point of view, the *Tafsīr* can be regarded as the culmination of an anti-Avicennian *crecendo* in Averroes' commentaries: starting with the early *Epitome* (ca. 1260), whose style and doctrine are still dependent on Avicennian models, despite the

¹⁰ On this interaction, see A. De Libera, *Penser au Moyen Âge*, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1991, pp. 111-112. A. Bertolacci, "Community of Translators: The Latin Medieval Versions of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Sifā* (Book of the Cure)", in *Communities of Learning: Networks and the Shaping of Intellectual Identity in Europe 1100-1450*, ed. J. N. Crossley, C. J. Meeks, Brepols, Turnhout, 2011.

¹¹ Ibn Rušd, *Tafsīr mā ba'd al-ṭabī'ā*. Texte arabe inédit établi par M. Bouyges. Imprimerie Catholique, Beirut 1938-1948. Latin translation: *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, Venetiis apud Iuncas 1562, rist. Minerva, Frankfurt am Main 1962 (vol. VIII: *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIII. Cum Averrois Cordubensis in eisdem Commentariis: Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*, ff. 1-355). Bibliographical references to the translations and studies regarding Averroes' *Tafsīr* can be found in P. H. Rosenmann, *Averroes: A Catalogue of Editions and scholarly Writings from 1821 Onwards*, "Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale", 30, 1988, pp. 153-221, and, for the following years, in the bibliographical data-base of the Thomas-Institut of the University of Cologne.

¹² For an overview of the Greek commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, see Luna, "Les commentaires", cit.; Bertolacci, *The Reception* cit., pp. 136-142.

occasional criticisms of Avicenna that occur here and there; passing through the substantially "neutral" middle commentary, in which Averroes adopts an objective attitude towards Aristotle's text, without discussing extensively the subsequent metaphysical tradition; this ascending polemical line culminates in the *Tafsīr*, whose second main purpose, complementary to the explanation of Aristotle's text, is just the dismissal of Avicenna's metaphysics. Paraphrasing a formula coined by A. I. Sabra in a famous article of 1984, we can envisage Averroes' *Tafsīr* as a particularly significant instance of "Andalusian revolt against Avicennian metaphysics"¹³.

Table 2 provides a list of the frequent, sweeping and harsh attacks against Avicenna occurring in the *Tafsīr*¹⁴.

Table 2: Criticisms of Avicenna in Averroes' Long Commentary on the *Metaphysics*

Averroes	doctrine criticized	remarks by Averroes	Avicenna
(1) α.15, pp. 46, 18-47, 3 [f. 35D]	[i] A man can be generated from earth, [ii] as a mouse is (an instance of the denial of a necessary link between specific forms and their matters).	In this and many other mistakes, Avicenna was influenced by the <i>Aṣ'ariyya</i> , "if he [indeed] held it [i.e. this doctrine] and did not disparage it".	[i] cp. <i>Ḥayawān</i> [= <i>De animalibus</i>] XVII, 1, p. 419, 9-10 [ii] <i>Ma'ādīn wa-ʿĀrār</i> 'shuyūp' [= <i>De diluvio</i>], II, 6, p. 77, 3-4
(2) α.15, p. 47, 10-12 [f. 35E]	Many followers of Avicenna ascribes to him the denial of the absence of plenum, void and time outside the world, and the denial of the existence of beings that are incorporeal, non-spatial and aetemporal.	This ascription is false.	
(3) Γ.3, pp. 313, 6-314, 1 [f. 67B-E]	"One" and "existent" signify non-essential features of things.	Avicenna made this error despite his familiarity with the <i>Aṣ'arite</i> theologians, who held a different position.	<i>Ilāhiyyāt</i> I, 5, pp. 31, 10-11; 32, 3; III, 2, p. 95, 15-17; 97, 4-5; 103, 9; III, 3, pp. 106, 12-13, 15; 109, 10; 110, 2-3, 4-5; VII, 1, p. 303, 9-10

¹³ A. I. Sabra, "The Andalusian Revolt against Ptolemaic Astronomy, Averroes and al-Bīrūnī", in *Transformation and Tradition in the Sciences*, ed. E. Mendelsohn, Cambridge 1984, pp. 133-153. On the doctrinal and ideological reasons governing Averroes' criticism of Avicenna's metaphysics, see A. Bertolacci, "The «Andalusian Revolt Against Avicennian Metaphysics»: Averroes' Criticism of Avicenna in the Long Commentary on the *Metaphysics*", in Proceedings of the Symposium *Averroes, Inverness, Immaturatione - XIV*, symposium annual de la SIEPM, Genève, 4-6 October 2006, ed. A. De Libera, forthcoming.

¹⁴ The relevant passages of the *Tafsīr* are reported in the left column of the table with the indication of the book of the *Metaphysics* and of the section of Averroes' exegesis (for instance: A.5 = book A, commentum 5); the number of pages and lines of Bouyges' edition (for instance: pp. 1420, 6-1421, 16); between square brackets, the indication of the folia of the Juncata edition of the Latin translation and their sections (for example: [f. 292K-M]).

Averroes	doctrine criticized	remarks by Averroes	Avicenna
(4) Γ.3, p. 315, 3-9 [f. 67G]	A thing is one in virtue of an entity added to its essence.		<i>Ibid.</i>
(5) Δ.5, p. 508, 9-11 [f. 107I]	The metaphysician demonstrates the existence of nature, whereas the natural philosopher takes it for granted from the metaphysician.		<i>Sana'ī</i> [= <i>Liber primus naturalium</i>] I, 5, pp. 30, 6-7; 31, 5-6
(6) Δ.14, p. 557, 16-19 [om.]	"Existent" is a derivative name and signifies an accident.		<i>Ilāhiyyāt</i> I, 5, pp. 31, 10-11; 32, 3; III, 2, p. 103, 9
(7) Δ.14, p. 558, 17-559, 14 [f. 117C-D]	Derivative names, like "white" signify primarily the subject (i.e. the thing that is white) and secondly the accident (i.e. whiteness)		<i>Ilāhiyyāt</i> III, 2, pp. 109, 17-110, 3
(8) Z.31, p. 882, 17-19 [f. 181B]	All forms of the sublunary world come from the Agent Intellect (Giver of Forms)	Themistius appears to share the same opinion, whereas Alexander agrees with Aristotle.	<i>Ilāhiyyāt</i> IX, 5, p. 413, 8-11; cp. IX, 5, p. 411, 9; <i>Kaṣṣ</i> wa- <i>fūṣṭāṭ</i> [= <i>De gen. et corr.</i>] I, 13, p. 187, 3, 14, p. 190, 14, 16; <i>Af'āl wa-ḥif'āṭ</i> [= <i>De actionibus et passionibus quadratum primum</i>] II, 1, p. 256, 10
(9) Z.31, pp. 885, 8-886, 3 [f. 181I]	The majority [of philosophers] (<i>al-qānum</i>) went against them [i.e. against Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias] in this issue, i.e. spontaneous generation, since they did not understand Aristotle's demonstration in this place, nor did they grasp its truth. This is surprising not only in the case of Avicenna, but also in the case of Abū Naṣr [al-Fārābī], since in his book on the two philosophies [of Plato and Aristotle], he seems to be hesitant in this matter.	The majority inclined towards the doctrine of Plato, since it is an opinion similar to what the theologians of our religion believe in this matter.	<i>Ibid.</i>
(10) I.5, pp. 1267, 15-1268, 3 [f. 255B]	The numerical "one" is a genus of all categories, since it signifies an accident common to them.		<i>Ilāhiyyāt</i> III, 1, p. 95, 15-17

Averroes	doctrine criticized	remarks by Averroes	Avicenna
(11) I.8, pp. 1279, 12-1280, [1] [f. 257E-G]	"Existent" and "one" signify non-essential feature of things.		<i>Ilāhiyyāt</i> I, 5, pp. 31, 10-11; 32, 3; 1, 8, p. 48, 5; III, 2, p. 95, 15-17; 97, 4-5; 103, 9; III, 3, pp. 106, 12-13, 15; 109, 10; 110, 2-3, 4-5; VII, 1, p. 303, 9-10
(12) I.8, p. 1282, 8-12 [f. 257K]	[f "existent" and "one" were synonyms of "thing", the statement "the thing is one" would be false.		
(13) A.5, pp. 1423, 18-1424, 4 [f. 293D]	Since Avicenna takes the statement "no science demonstrates its own principles" in an absolute sense, he believes that the metaphysician clarifies the existence of the principles of sensible substance, whereas the natural philosopher takes for granted from the metaphysician the existence of nature.		<i>Ilāhiyyāt</i> I, 2, p. 14, 2-3; II, 3, p. 78, 14; III, 7, p. 139, 12-13; VI, 5, p. 294, 4-5; <i>Sammā</i> I, 5, pp. 30, 6-7; 31, 5-6
(14) A.5, p. 1426, 11-12 [f. 293K]	The obscurity of Alexander's statement (p. 1420, 8-10), according to which the metaphysician demonstrates the principles of the existents, whereas the physician admits their existence, led Avicenna into error.		
(15) A.6, p. 1436, 5-6 [f. 293D]	Averroes recalls quotation (14).		
(16) A.8, p. 1442, 14-16 [f. 296D]	The proof of the existence of first matter does not belong to natural philosophy.		<i>Sammā</i> I, 2, pp. 16, 17-18; 17, 20-18, 2
(17) A.10, p. 1447, 13-16 [f. 297A]	Matter in potency is present in all bodies.		<i>Ilāhiyyāt</i> II, 2, p. 67, 12-13.
(18) A.18, pp. 1498, 12-15; [f. 304 C]	Avicenna is among those who think that the agent that creates the forms and places them in matter is immaterial and is called Giver of Forms.	The belief in the creation of forms is common to the advocates of the Giver of Forms and the Jewish, Christian and Muslim theologians.	<i>Ilāhiyyāt</i> IX, 5, p. 413, 8-11
(19) A.41, p. 1632, 1-3 [f. 324I-K]	"Necessary" can be divided into "necessary by itself" and "necessary, in virtue of something else".	According to Averroes, the situation in which a thing is possible by itself, and necessary, in virtue of something else, is limited to the heavenly movement.	<i>Ilāhiyyāt</i> I, 7, p. 47, 10-19; VI, 3, p. 277, 4-6.

Table 2 documents that Averroes is a competent and careful reader of Avicenna (he questions the authorship of doctrine 1, for example, and discards doctrine 2 as not authentic). It also attests, however, that he aims at demolishing Avicenna's metaphysics, in order to preserve and restore Aristotle's metaphysical system. It is not coincidental that Averroes' criticisms hit the main elements of Avicenna's reworking of this discipline, in terms of both form and content, illustrated before. As to the content of Avicenna's metaphysics, Averroes is particularly severe with the fundamental doctrine of the primary concepts, especially Avicenna's view of the relationship of "one" and "existent" with essence (nn. 3-4, 6-7, 10-12), and his distinction between Necessary Existent (God) and possible existent in ontology (n. 19); he attacks also his account of physical substance in ontology (n. 17) and the doctrine of the Giver of Forms in theology (nn. 8, 18). As to the form of Avicenna's metaphysics, Averroes rejects Avicenna's view of the relationship between metaphysics and the other sciences, in particular natural philosophy (nn. 5, 13-16); he also remarks his distance from Aristotle's position (n. 9) and his closeness to Platonic metaphysics and Islamic revealed theology (Averroes' remarks on nn. 1, 3, 9, 18). If we add to these criticisms those occurring in the Long Commentaries on the *Posterior Analytics* and the *Physics*, where Averroes' discards Avicenna's proof of "existent" as the subject-matter of metaphysics by stressing that Avicenna's method in metaphysics is not demonstrative¹⁵, we realize that his dismissal of Avicenna's metaphysics is intentionally complete and definitive.

Averroes' attempt to make the history of metaphysics going back in time to Aristotle and his Greek commentators, skipping Avicenna's contribution, had no success in the Arab world¹⁶. However, since all the Greek commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, as well as the other Arabic commentaries on this work, remained almost unknown in the Latin world¹⁷, Averroes' *Tafsīr* was the only extensive exegesis of this work available in the 12th century. As such its Latin translation, made at the beginning of the 13th century, rapidly spread in European universities.

¹⁵ See A. Bertolacci, "Avicenna and Averroes on the Proof of God's Existence and the Subject-Matter of Metaphysics", *Medioevo*, 32, 2007, pp. 61-97.

¹⁶ Averroes' commentary on the *Metaphysics* is preserved in only one known manuscript (Leiden, University Library Or. 2074 [Ar. 1692]), whereas more than one hundred manuscripts of Avicenna's *Ilāhiyyāt* are currently known (see A. Bertolacci, "On the Manuscripts of the *Ilāhiyyāt* of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Sif*", in *Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages: Studies in Text, Transmission and Translation, in Honour of Hans Daiber*, ed. A. Akasoy, W. Raven, Brill, Leiden 2008, pp. 59-75).

¹⁷ See L. Minio-Paluello, "Note sull'Aristotele latino medievale. VII. Manoscritti aristotelici latini del XII secolo con note contemporanee: Scoli greci alla «Metafisica» tradotti in latino da Giacomo Veneto", *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscholastica*, 44, 1952, pp. 485-495; also in Id., *Opuscula. The Latin Aristotle*, Hakkerit, Amsterdam 1972, pp. 178-188.

Cologne

The commentary on the *Metaphysics* is one of the last commentaries on Aristotle that Albertus Magnus wrote¹⁸. It was composed between 1264 and 1267, almost two decades after the first commentary of the series, the one on the *Physics*, written shortly after 1248 in Cologne, where Albertus Magnus founded and directed for several years the first Dominican *studium generale* in Germany. Albertus was now a retired bishop in Würzburg¹⁹. He had just preached the crusade (1263-1264), following the order of Pope Urban IV. We face thus the remarkable case of a person that, as Christian bishop, obeys the Pope's will of waging a war against the Muslim infidels, and, as scholar, uses in his works Arabic writings written by Muslim authors.

Albertus' attitude towards the two paradigmatic and antithetic interpretations of the *Metaphysics* provided by the *Ilāhiyyāt* and the *Tafsīr* is interesting in many respects. First, historically, it exemplifies the crucial phase of transmission of Arabic metaphysics into Latin, in so far as it documents the process of joint reception of these two fundamental accounts of the *Metaphysics* in one of the earliest, most extensive and most influential Latin accounts of Aristotle's work. Albertus' commentary is unique in this respect, since it is the first known example of interpretation of the *Metaphysics* in Latin that relies massively on *both* Avicenna's and Averroes' works on the subject. Before Albertus, the lines of transmission of the *Ilāhiyyāt* and the *Tafsīr* had remained separate: the Latin reception of Avicenna's metaphysics is witnessed either by theological works or by treatises on specific metaphysical or epistemological topics, whereas the exegesis of the *Metaphysics* is based almost exclusively on Averroes' model, with a decided neglect of Avicenna's contribution. With Albertus, for the first time, these two lines of transmission merge and interact. Albeit quantitatively different (the use of Avicenna is less extensive than that of Averroes), the recourse to Avicenna and Averroes is qualitatively analogous, in so far as Albertus accords to both authors an equally important, although distinct, function: Averroes helps to explain the text, Avicenna contributes to its doctrinal enrichment. Consequently, the amount of space and degree of attention that Albertus devotes to Avicenna and Averroes in the commentary is similar to the one accorded to Aristotle: he reports the *Ilāhiyyāt* and the *Tafsīr* comprehensively, signalling the cases in which the content of these two works is, for some reason, noteworthy. Due to the similarity of the exegetical technique that Albertus applies to Aristotle's,

¹⁸ Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica, libri quinque priores*, ed. B. Geyer, Aschendorff, Münster 1960; *Metaphysica, libri VII-XII*, ed. B. Geyer, Aschendorff, Münster 1964.

¹⁹ See J. A. Weisheipl, "Albert's Works on Natural Science (libri naturales) in Probable Chronological Order", in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980*, ed. J. A. Weisheipl, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto 1980, pp. 565-577 (576); Id., "The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great", *ibid.*, pp. 13-51. On Albertus' stay in Würzburg, see T. Beckmann, A. Zumbeller, *Geschichte des Würzburger Augustinerklosters nach der Gründung im Jahre 1262 bis zur Gegenwart*, Augustinus-Verlag, Würzburg 2001, pp. 4-5 and the bibliography reported there.

Avicenna's and Averroes' texts, it is not far-fetched to view his commentary on the *Metaphysics* also as a kind of "super-commentary", albeit *in nuce*, of the *Ilāhiyyāt* and the *Tafsīr*.

The joint dependence on the *Ilāhiyyāt* and the *Tafsīr* is mirrored – and this is the second element of interest – in the style of Albertus' commentary on the *Metaphysics*, as well as of his other Aristotelian commentaries. Among the different kinds of exegesis applied to Aristotle's works in history (Alexander of Aphrodisias' literal commentaries, Themistius' paraphrases, Nicholas of Damascus' abridgements etc.), Albertus' commentaries represent a case on their own. They can be defined "paraphrases with digressions": they consist of chapters that clarify, by way of paraphrase, the meaning of Aristotle's text, intermingled with autonomous chapters in which the doctrine of the text previously paraphrased is either accounted for anew through a different and more thorough way of explanation, or is confronted with possible objections, or is related to the interpretations provided by the commentators. This stylistic peculiarity of Albertus' commentaries is related to Avicenna and Averroes in a double respect. Formally, it stems from Avicenna's reworking of Aristotle's works and from Averroes' exegesis of them: in an Avicennian vein, Albertus replaces the text commented upon by his own rephrasing of it; on the footsteps of Averroes, he opens in the continuous, systematic and detailed interpretation of Aristotle's text frequent doctrinal parentheses. From the point of view of content, in the commentary on the *Metaphysics*, as well as in other commentaries, this double register of paraphrases and digressions is fit to incorporate the contributions of Avicenna and Averroes: Albertus mainly quotes Averroes' literal exegesis of the *Metaphysics* in the explicative paraphrases, whereas he preferably cites Avicenna's doctrinal developments in the digressions. In this way, the contributions of Avicenna and Averroes remain separate within two different structural levels of the commentary, but can also interact and balance each other in the overall architecture of the work. Of Albertus' commentary on the *Metaphysics*, the *Tafsīr* represents – so to say – the "basis", whereas the *Ilāhiyyāt* constitutes the "height" and the trait-d'union connecting the exegesis of Aristotle's work with the Neoplatonic speculation of the *Liber de causis* (a work which Albertus comments upon after the *Metaphysics* and regards as an Aristotelian oeuvre, albeit not *stricto sensu* a work by Aristotle). In other words, the articulated format of Albertus' commentary – itself a kind of synthesis of the exegetical styles adopted by Avicenna and Averroes – allows a use of sources in which the borrowings from Avicenna and Averroes are, at the same time, structurally distinct from, and functionally complementary to, one another.

Third, from the point of view of doctrine, Albertus is not only receptive, but also original with regard to his two sources. His originality surfaces not only when he rejects particular theories of either Avicenna or Averroes, as it happens quite often. More interestingly, the joint reliance on Averroes and Avicenna implies and underscores the presence in Albertus' commentary of an original theoretical appa-

rans, by means of which he accounts for and solves the conflict between the metaphysics of these two authors. In front of Averroes' criticisms of Avicenna in the *Tafsīr*, Albertus adopts a harmonizing strategy, striving to focus on similarities and to sweep away differences. This strategy consists in "hiding", as much as possible, the dissent. Thus, on the one hand, he omits many criticisms of Avicenna contained in the *Tafsīr*.²⁰ On the other hand, he reports the remaining criticisms without stating explicitly that, on the issue under discussion, Averroes is criticizing Avicenna. The concealment of dissent in this latter case is performed in many ways. Either Albertus presents the criticism as coming from Averroes, but as regarding in general a group unidentified authors (*alii*), rather than Avicenna in particular;²¹ or, viceversa, he presents the criticism as regarding Avicenna, but provides no indication as to its source²²; or he disguises the identity of both the target and the source of the criticism by means of expressions like *quidam* and *quidam alii*²³; or he mentions only the target of the criticism by means of a disguised reference to *quidam*²⁴; or, finally, he resumes only the argument by means of which Averroes refutes Avicenna's doctrine, with no indication as to its source and target.²⁵ From the point of view of content, Albertus either endorses Averroes' stand-point²⁶; or he rejects both the doctrine of Avicenna criticized by Averroes (ascribed to *quidam*), and the doctrine of Averroes (ascribed to *quidam alii*) on account of which this latter criticizes Avicenna²⁷; or he discards the criticism showing that it misses the point²⁸. Due to this articulated strategy, the commentary on the *Metaphysics* represents a noteworthy case: it is the only Aristotelian commentary in which Albertus, despite using the corresponding long commentary of Averroes, does not reproduce explicitly any of the criticisms of Avicenna that he finds in his source²⁹.

In general, Albertus reaches the consensus between Avicenna and Averroes in a subtle way, by means of an interpretation capable of showing that their positions, *prima facie* mutually incongruent, do in fact coincide, or represent complementa-

ry aspects of the discussed issues, or share the same fundamental elements. This strategy – openly avowed in other Aristotelian commentaries³⁰ – is silently pursued in the commentary on the *Metaphysics*. Thus, Albertus' dependence on Avicenna and Averroes, together with the antagonism between these two authors on many key metaphysical issues, entails a considerable amount of philosophical depth and doctrinal elaboration in the commentary on the *Metaphysics*. Far from preventing originality, or being the specimen of naive syncretism, his endorsement of Arabic metaphysics implies a remarkable degree of creativeness and innovation.

Conclusion

The Mediterranean Sea is the scenario in which Aristotle's *Metaphysics* first came to light, and around which then it circulated. The present contribution has focused on four main phases of the history of this work: its "formation" due to Aristotle and Andronicus of Rhodes in Athens; its "reform" by Avicenna in Işfahān, its "explanation" by Averroes in Cordoba, and its "assimilation" by Albertus Magnus in Cologne. These different stages correspond to different exegetical formats: the insertion in a *corpus* of writings, the reworking, the literal commentary, and the paraphrase with digressions.

Despite its length in time and its various characters and stand-points, this journey presents a remarkable continuity in what we can call its "epistemic background": in all the stages, *Metaphysics* is part and crucial element of a system of knowledge that remains in principle the same, although it may change in the forms of presentation. Knowledge is always conceived as an all-encompassing (encyclopedic) and coherent (systematic) network, in which all elements are interconnected. It is not coincidental that all the authors considered here (Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes and Albertus Magnus) were – to use an expression that is proper of Albertus alone, but fits all equally well – "Doctores Universales". With the scientific revolution, this system of knowledge, which starts with logic and ends with practical philosophy, collapsed, and the single disciplines escaped the constraints of hierarchical classification, gaining autonomy and independence. At this point, metaphysics lost its former function of *regina scientiarum* and the *Metaphysics* ceased to be an authoritative text.

²⁰ Completely omitted are the criticisms nn. 1-2, 5, 8-9, 11-12, 14-17, 19 in Table 2, above. The criticism n. 6 is omitted in the Latin translation of the *Tafsīr*.

²¹ In the only place in which Albertus explicitly quotes Averroes while reporting a criticism of him against Avicenna, Avicenna himself is not named: cp. criticism n. 18 with *Alb. XI*, 1, 8, p. 476, 9-41.

²² In the only place in which Albertus explicitly quotes Avicenna while reporting a criticism of Averroes against him (cp. criticism n. 3 with *Alb. IV*, 1, 5, p. 166, 74, p. 167, 15, 39, 56), Averroes himself is not named.

²³ Cp. criticism n. 13 with *Alb. XI*, 1, 3, p. 462, 73-77, 81-83.

²⁴ Cp. criticism n. 10 with *Alb. X*, 1, 5, p. 437, 19-27, 33-34.

²⁵ Cf. criticism n. 4 with *Alb. IV*, 1, 4, p. 166, 42-51; and criticism n. 6 with *Alb. V*, 1, 11, p. 234, 37-42.

²⁶ See previous footnote.

²⁷ See footnote 23.

²⁸ See footnote 22. The report of Averroes' criticism n. 10 in *Alb. X*, 1, 5, p. 437, 19-27, 33-34, refers conclusively to this place.

²⁹ See, on the contrary, the commentary on the *Physics* I, 3, 18, II, 1, 10; the commentary on the *De Caelo* II, 3, 5, II, 3, III, 2, I, III, 2, 8; and the *De causis proprietatum elementorum* I, 2, 13. In the commentary on the *De anima* II, 3, 33, Albertus reports an *altercatio* between Alexander, Themistius and Avicenna, on the hand, and Averroes, on the other, which does not correspond, however, to any criticism of Averroes against Avicenna.

³⁰ See, for example, *De causis proprietatum elementorum* I, 2, 13, p. 86, 53-54; "Viderur autem mihi, quod utrique [sc. Avicennae et Averroei] secundum aliquid consentiendum sit"; *De anima* II, 3, 7, p. 109, 46-47; "Nos autem quantum intelligere possumus, utroque [sc. Avicennam cum Averroem, et Averroem cum Alexandro] secundum aliquam partem verum dicere arbitramur".