

Subsidia Albertina II

Via Alberti

Texte – Quellen – Interpretationen

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The Reception of Averroes'  
Long Commentary on the *Metaphysics*  
in Latin Medieval Philosophy until Albertus Magnus

*Amos Bertolacci, Pisa*

That Albertus Magnus relies extensively on Averroes (Ibn Rušd, d. 1198) in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* is evident. A mere look to the index of authors quoted by Albertus in this commentary makes it clear: after Aristotle, Averroes is the *auctoritas* most frequently referred to.<sup>1</sup> The present article aims at showing that, in the commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Albertus cites the Latin translation of Averroes' main metaphysical work – the Long Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (henceforth: *LCM*) – directly, keeping this work in front of him and quoting immediately from it.<sup>2</sup> The direct recourse to *LCM* will be argued for negatively, by pointing out that Albertus does not take from previous philosophers his acquaintance with, and his mentions of, this work. This independence from earlier Latin authors is indicative of a more general fact, i. e. that Albertus' commentary marks a »new beginning« of the Latin reception of *LCM*: whereas the previous Latin exegesis of the *Metaphysics* is based almost exclusively on Averroes' model, with a substantial neglect of Avicenna's contribution, in Albertus' commentary the massive recourse to Averroes is joined with a qualitatively analogous reliance on Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, d. 1037), in so far as both authors are assigned an equally important, although distinct, function: *LCM* helps to explain Aristotle's text, Avicenna's *Philosophia prima* contributes to its doctrinal enrichment. In this regard, Albertus' commentary on the

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- 1 See ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Metaph.* index auct. (Ed. Colon. 16/2), 600–603. A detailed description of all the different types of quotations of Averroes in Albertus' commentary on the *Metaphysics* – explicit nominal quotations (»Averroes«, »Commentator«), explicit indeterminate quotations (»quidam«, »alii« etc.), and implicit (silent) quotations, is in preparation by the author (see BERTOLACCI [in progress], chapter 2). A similar inventory of the quotations of Avicenna can be found in BERTOLACCI 1998; BERTOLACCI 2001. An overview of the influence of Averroes in Albertus' works is available in WÉBER 1994.
- 2 AVERROES, *Tafsīr mā ba'd at-Ṭabī'at*, ed. Bouyges; Latin translation: AVERROES, *Comm. Mag. Metaph.* The following quotations of the Latin translation of this work report: the indication of the book of the *Metaphysics* and of the section of Averroes' exegesis (for instance: Λ, 5 = book Λ, commentum 5); the indication of the folia of the Juncta edition and their sections (for example: fol. 292K–M).

*Metaphysics* represents a new phase and a turning point of the process of assimilation of Arabic metaphysics into Latin.<sup>3</sup>

In what follows, I will argue Albertus' originality with respect to the four most important previous commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, all written around the middle of the 13<sup>th</sup> century: they are the commentaries by Richard Rufus of Cornwall, Adam of Buckfield, and Geoffrey of Aspall in Oxford, and by Roger Bacon in Paris. First, I will point out that Albertus is independent from Richard Rufus of Cornwall (§ 1) and Adam of Buckfield (§ 2) in his quotations of *LCM*. Then, I will adduce evidence attesting that he possibly criticizes Geoffrey of Aspall and/or Roger Bacon about the issue of the subject-matter of metaphysics (§ 3).

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### § 1 Richard Rufus of Cornwall (d. after 1259)

The still unpublished commentary on the *Metaphysica Nova* (*Scriptum super Metaphysicam*) by Richard Rufus of Cornwall is a *sententia cum quaestionibus*.<sup>4</sup> Although it shows acquaintance also with other Latin versions of the *Metaphysics*, it is essentially a commentary on the *Metaphysica Nova*, namely the version of the *Metaphysics* contained in the Latin translation of *LCM*.<sup>5</sup> It is the

3 I deal in detail with this theme in BERTOLACCI [forthcoming].

4 Partial editions in PATTIN 2002, 99–104 (beginning of Introduction); ZIMMERMANN 1998, 113–116 (end of Introduction); DONATI 2003, 42–52 (l. 4, lec. 1); NOONE 1993, 18–23 (l. 11, d. 2, lec. 1, q. 3–4; lec. 3, q. 2; lec. 7, q. 11–12; the comprehensive edition of l. 11, d. 2, can be found in NOONE 1987). On its manuscript tradition, see DONATI 2003. Excerpts of this work, according to the MS Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Apost. Vatic., Vat. lat. 4538, fol. 1<sup>ra</sup>–102<sup>va</sup>, can be found in GAL 1950, 211–228, 239–242 *passim* (Gal does not ascribe this commentary to Rufus, but regards it as his source); NOONE 1989, 79–80; WOOD 1998, 42–45, 48 (Wood calls this work *Dissertatio in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*); DONATI 2003, 34 n. 16; DONATI 2005 *passim*. A comprehensive list of the questions discussed in the commentary is available in ZIMMERMANN 1971, 127–131 (cf. GAL 1950, 232–239; ZIMMERMANN 1998, 113–116, and DONATI 2003, 44–50, provide different lists, respectively, of the questions of the Introduction and of the initial questions on *Metaph. Γ*). On the doctrine of the subject-matter of metaphysics in Rufus' commentary, see CALLUS 1963, 393–395; ZIMMERMANN 1998, 198–200.

5 The introduction of the commentary is based on the *Metaphysica Vetus* (see PATTIN 2002, 99, 3; GAL 1950, 211; CALLUS 1963, 393–394), and the exegesis of A, 5 starts a few lines before the beginning of the *Metaphysica Nova* (see DONATI 2005, 249 n. 55). For this reason, Rufus' work is sometimes portrayed as a commentary on both the *Metaphysica Nova* and the *Metaphysica Vetus* (see NOONE 1997, 253–254); in fact, it is based only on the former (see DONATI 2005, 236 n. 12, 249 n. 55). For the quotations of a passage of the *Metaphysica Media* [N, 2 (1088b17–18)] in Rufus' commentary, see VUILLEMIN-DIEM 1976, XXVII–XXVIII.

only commentary on the *Metaphysics* that, at the present stage of research, can be ascribed with certainty to Rufus.<sup>6</sup> It was probably written in Oxford sometimes during the 1240s.<sup>7</sup> It appears to be quoted in Adam of Buckfield's commentary on the *Metaphysics*,<sup>8</sup> whereas its relationship to Roger Bacon's commentary on the same work is less clear.<sup>9</sup> Also Albertus knew it, as his criticisms attest.<sup>10</sup> Even though it has good credentials to be the earliest Latin commentary on the *Metaphysics*,<sup>11</sup> it witnesses the pre-existence of a lively, and philosophically sophisticated, discussion on the most relevant issues raised by

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According to Rufus, the *Metaphysica Vetus* (or part of it) and book  $\alpha$  constitute, together, the first book of the *Metaphysics*, whose second book is  $\beta$  (see PATTIN 2002, 104); thus, book  $\gamma$  is possibly regarded by Rufus neither as second (as in PATTIN 2002, 105), nor as fourth (as in DONATI 2003, 43), but as third (the reading *eius tractatus* in MS Oxford, Balliol College 241, fol. 211<sup>va</sup>, in DONATI 2003, 43, might stand for *tertius tractatus*).

- 6 Whereas the proof of Rufus's authorship of the *Scriptum* proposed by NOONE 1989 is unanimously accepted (see DONATI 2003, 33; DONATI 2005, 237–238), Wood's ascription to Rufus of a further, supposedly earlier, commentary on the *Metaphysics* (the *quaestiones* in MS Erfurt, UB, Dep. Erf., CA Q. 290, fol. 46<sup>ra</sup>–55<sup>vb</sup>; see WOOD 1998) still needs to be conclusively proved, especially in the light of the sharp differences between this commentary and two other works ascribed to Rufus (*De causa individuationis* and *De ideis*) on the topic of the individuation of primary substances (see KARGER 1998, and DONATI 2005, 238, 316, 343–344).
- 7 The evidence (originally underscored by GAL 1950, 214–215) that WOOD 1998, 48, adduces to argue that this commentary was composed in Paris before 1238 – i. e. the fact that in the commentary on the *Sentences* ascribed to Rufus, the author refers to some doctrines occurring in the *Scriptum super Metaphysicam* as opinions held by *saeculares philosophi*, an expression supposedly designating Rufus himself before his entrance in the Franciscan order in 1238 – is not conclusive (see the critical remarks in DONATI 2005, 343–344). T. Noone places the composition of the commentary in Oxford in the 1240s (NOONE 1993, 2), or in the late 1240s (NOONE 1997, 253); his opinion is shared by PATTIN 2002, 97, who proposes the middle of the XIII c. – more precisely the period between 1238 and 1250 – as date of composition.
- 8 The presence of parallels between Rufus' and Adam of Buckfield's commentaries on the *Metaphysics*, first underscored by NOONE 1989, 79–80, has been clarified as a dependence of the latter upon the former by WOOD 1997, 231–232, and DONATI 2003, 34 n. 16. NOONE 1997, 253, portrays Rufus' commentary as »transitional«, from the stylistic point of view, between Adam's *sententia* and Geoffrey of Aspill's *quaestiones*.
- 9 ZIMMERMANN 1992, 220, states that in the commentary on the *Metaphysics* Roger Bacon rejects Rufus' view of the subject-matter of this discipline; inversely, in ZIMMERMANN 1998, 198, he maintains that Rufus criticizes a doctrine that can be found in Roger's commentary.
- 10 In the commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Albertus Magnus criticizes the doctrine of universals contained in Rufus' commentary, portraying it as the view either of Plato, or of some unnamed thinkers (see KARGER 2005).
- 11 ZIMMERMANN 1998, 156, on the other hand, portrays Roger Bacon's commentary as the earliest known commentary on the *Metaphysics*.

the *Metaphysics*.<sup>12</sup> It contains many references to *LCM*: in them, Averroes is named by means of both his proper name and the honorific title »Commentator« (one of the first occurrences of this designation).<sup>13</sup> On two occasions, statements of Averroes are discussed in the questions, thus attesting that *LCM* was not only the main exegetical tool, but also occasionally the object of Rufus' commentary.<sup>14</sup> The *sententia*, however, rather than the *quaestiones*, is the place of Rufus' commentary where the influence of *LCM* is most visible.<sup>15</sup> Rufus' dependence on Averroes for the explanation of Aristotle's text, and on the philosophical and theological writings of Robert Grosseteste for the doctrine of the *quaestiones*, has been pointed out.<sup>16</sup>

Table 1 shows how Rufus and Albertus quoted the beginning of Averroes' commentary on *Metaphysics* Γ. The table provides, from left to right, Averroes' text and Rufus' and Albertus' quotations. Words that are identical in Averroes,

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- 12 Rufus ascribes to some unnamed philosophers (*quidam*) the »theologizing« view according to which metaphysics finds its unity primarily in substance, ultimately in the first cause, i. e. in the primary substance (ZIMMERMANN 1998, 114, 34–38). He counters this view by proposing the substance of prime matter as the ultimate unifying factor of metaphysics (*ibid.*, 114, 45–46). On the issue of the eternity of the world, Rufus reports and dismisses the attempts of two groups of thinkers (*quidam* and *alii*) of *excusare* and *salvare* Aristotle's doctrine by accommodating it with a creationist perspective (GAL 1950, 222–223). At 222, n. 1, Gal reports the analogous animosity of Robert Grosseteste against *quidam moderni* who, on the same issue, try to reconcile Aristotle with Christian dogma, and proposes Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus and Alexander of Hales as proponents of the tendency that Rufus and Grosseteste reject.
- 13 On Rufus' references to Averroes in general, see NOONE 1989, 66, 76–77; WOOD 1997, 229–230; WOOD 1998, 41 (no quotation of Avicenna is signaled in these studies). Passages containing quotations (explicit determinate and implicit) of *LCM* can be found in GAL 1950, 212 (*sententia*; cf. AVERROES, *Comm. Mag. Metaph.* incipit of Z, fol. 152L–M); NOONE 1989, 79–80 [*sententia*; cf. AVERROES, *Comm. Mag. Metaph.* Λ, 44, fol. 327H, on *Metaph.* Λ, 8 (1073b1–3)]; ZIMMERMANN 1998, 115 [*quaestio*; cf. AVERROES, *Comm. Mag. Metaph.* Z, 9, fol. 159M–160A, on *Metaph.* Z, 1 (1029a30–33)]; DONATI 2003, 43–46, 56 [*sententia*; cf. AVERROES, *Comm. Mag. Metaph.* Γ, 1–2, fol. 64B–65L *passim*, on *Metaph.* Γ, 1–2 *passim*; *ibid.* I, 23, fol. 274H, on *Metaph.* I, 9 (1058a32–34)]. The implicit quotation of Averroes occurring in *quaestio* 1 (see DONATI 2003, 44 n. 44) can be compared also with AVERROES, *Comm. Mag. Metaph.* Z, 9, fol. 159M (»scientia naturalis non considerat de rebus secundum quod sunt substantiae«). References to Averroes in the exegesis of *Metaph.* α are mentioned by PATTIN 2002, 98. For examples of Rufus' quotations of other works of Averroes, see DONATI 2005, 306–307.
- 14 See ZIMMERMANN 1971, 129 (a question on a passage of Averroes' exegesis of *Metaph.* Γ), 131 (a question on a passage of Averroes' exegesis of *Metaph.* Z).
- 15 Most of the quotations of Averroes (see above, n. 13), occur in Rufus' *sententia*. Averroes is quoted in none of the *solutiones quaestionum* reported by GAL 1950, 239–242.
- 16 WOOD 1997, 229–230; NOONE 1997, 254 (cp. NOONE 1993, 3).



on the one hand, and in Rufus or Albertus, on the other, are reported in bold. Words or expression similar, although not identical, are underlined. Rufus and Albertus quote this passage of Averroes in different ways: this attests that Albertus had access to *LCM* independently from Rufus. The quotation is different in form (it is explicit in Rufus, implicit in Albertus), and length (it is less extensive in Rufus, more extensive in Albertus). The few similarities between Rufus and Albertus with no correspondence in Averroes are marked by small capitals.

Table 1

AVERROES, <i>Comm. Mag. Metaph.</i> , fol. 64B–D	RICHARD RUFUS OF CORNWALL, <i>Scrip. sup. Metaph.</i> (in: DONATI 2003, 43)	ALBERTUS MAGNUS, <i>Metaph.</i> 1. 4, tr. 1, c. 1 (Ed. Colon. 16/1), 161, 9–45
[1] <b>Iste tractatus</b> continet <b>duas partes</b> .	[a] <b>Iste</b> autem [sc. tractatus] secundum Commentatorem dividitur in <b>duas partes</b> :	[xi] et in his <b>duobus tractatibus</b> completus est <b>iste liber</b> quartus.
[2] <b>Prima</b> igitur est in definiendo <b>subiectum istius</b> artis <b>et accidentia et causas</b> eius	[b] in <b>prima</b> DETERMINAT actor quid est <b>subiectum huius</b> philosophie <b>et</b> que sunt <b>cause</b> et PRINCIPIA huius subiecti <b>et</b> etiam per se <b>accidentia</b>	[vii] Hoc autem habito stabilita est sufficienter scientia <b>ista</b> , cum iam DETERMINATA SUNT PRINCIPIA et quaesita et <b>subiectum</b> et <b>passiones ipsius</b> . Hoc igitur principaliter facere intendimus in hoc libro quarto.
[3] <b>et</b> universaliter in <b>rebus logicis quae appropriantur huic scientiae</b> .	[c] <b>et res logicas que appropriantur huic scientie</b> ;	
[4] <b>In secunda</b> autem <b>disputat</b> cum <b>sophistis</b> ,	[d] <b>in secunda disputat</b> contra <b>sophistas</b> ,	[x] Ideo ex consequenti manifestabimus mendacium huiusmodi <b>sophistarum</b> ,
[5] <b>qui negant primas propositiones</b> et <b>destruunt scire</b> ,	[e] <b>qui negant primas propositiones</b> sive dignitates, utpote »de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio« et alias <b>et sic destruunt scire</b> .	[ix] quidam contradicunt <b>principiis</b> illis, asserentes nihil penitus <b>scire</b> aliquem nec <b>scire</b> posse.
[6] prius declarando quod docens huiusmodi artis debet disputare cum istis.		cf. [viii] Ex consequenti autem, quia scientia de primo ente, secundum quod est ens, est etiam de <b>primis</b> principiis demonstrationis omnium scientiarum ...
[7] Quia igitur intentio eius est loqui de modo considerationis istius artis,		cf. [iii] Restat igitur nunc, ut ostendamus in hoc libro sapientiam hanc esse talium quaesitorum et per huiusmodi extremas causas, quales assignavimus,

[8] et iam perscrutatus est in tractatu praecedenti de scientia, quae dicitur philosophia, quae scientia sit,

[9] et dixit quod, si scientia omnium causarum est una, illa scientia debet dici philosophia;

[10] deinde declaravit quod consideratio de **omnibus causis omnium entium** non est unius scientiae, cum entia sint diversa, quoniam in quibusdam inveniuntur de causis quatuor quod non invenitur in quibusdam; hoc enim esset possibile, si entia essent unum genus;

[11] deinde induxit ipse sermonem quod philosophia forte est illa quae considerat de nobilissima causarum, scilicet de **primo fine et forma prima**;

[12] incoepit in hoc tractatu declarare hoc secundum demonstrationem et declarationem perfectam.

cf. [ii] Praelibatum est etiam in eo qui est ante hunc, libro, quae sunt quaesita istius sapientiae, ad quae causae iam dudum investigatae quaeruntur.

cf. [i] Iam complevimus in praecedentibus libris, de quibus causis inquirere habet haec scientia, quoniam inquirent hic causae primae, quae extremae sunt in resolutione causarum et principiorum.

[iv] licet enim iam dixerimus in praemissis non omnis entis esse omnes causas, quia si omnes causae aequae principaliter essent omnis entis, oporteret, quod omne ens esset eiusdem naturae cum ente transmutabili, in quo convenient omnes causae ... Non igitur entis, in quantum est ens, sunt omnes causae.

[v] Diximus autem in praehabitis, quod sapiens, qui dicitur philosophus, est doctissimus causarum; principaliter autem cognoscit **finem ultimum et formam primam** entis, secundum quod est ens.

[vi] Et hoc quidem sine demonstratione dictum est in praehabitis, nunc autem demonstrare intendimus, quod est quaedam scientia quae per extrema et prima principia formae primae et finis ultimi considerat ens, in quantum est ens, et quae insunt enti.

Rufus quotes only a part of Averroes' pericope (sections [1]–[5]), just paraphrasing Averroes' text, of which he respects the order. Albertus, on the other hand, quotes a longer portion of Averroes' text (sections [1]–[2], [4]–[12]), adopting a much more original formulation, and an order of exposition markedly different. Two remarks are in order. First, Albertus quotes some passages of Averroes' text that Rufus does not quote. This is the case of sections [6]–[12]. Among them, sections [10]–[12] are the ones more literally reported by Albertus ([iv]–[vi]). Sections [6]–[9], on the other hand, inspire the general theme of the corresponding sections of Albertus ([i]–[iii], [viii])

– since Albertus develops a point that Averroes has just adumbrated, or, like Averroes, refers to the previous books of the *Metaphysics* – but differ from these latter as to the precise content. Second, although both Albertus and Rufus quote four of the first five sections of Averroes' text, Albertus' report is much less faithful than Rufus', both in content and terminology.<sup>17</sup> This makes clear that Albertus uses *LCM* independently from Rufus.

## § 2 Adam of Buckfield (d. 1285)

That Averroes' long commentaries are the main sources of Adam of Buckfield's commentaries on Aristotle is well known.<sup>18</sup> Adam's commentary (*sententia*) on the *Metaphysica Nova*<sup>19</sup> was written in Oxford sometimes during the 1240s (Adam was active as master of arts in Oxford in 1243),<sup>20</sup> apparently after Richard Rufus of Cornwall's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, on which it depends.<sup>21</sup> The exegesis of book  $\alpha$  is the only part of Adam's commentary that has been integrally published so far.<sup>22</sup> Its inspection shows how massively the

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- 17 Some similarities between Albertus and Rufus surface in section [2]: both use the verb *determinare* and both employ the term *principium* as synonym of cause. These similarities, however, are small and localized, and insufficient to attest an influence of Rufus on Albertus.
- 18 »The influence of Averroes is reflected throughout all Buckfield's works [...] Comment after comment is often a mere paraphrase of Averroes' exposition«, CALLUS 1943, 256; »[...] the commentary of Adam of Buckfield on the nova translatio [of the *Metaphysics*] shows considerable borrowings from the Great Commentary of Averroes«, PLEVANO 1993, 169; »Averroes' large commentaries provide the most obvious model for Adam«, BURNETT 1996, 41–42.
- 19 MAURER 1950, 218 and n. 12, notices a reference to an *alia translatio* (ascribed to a certain Johannes) in Adam's exegesis of *Metaph.* E, 4 (1027b33–1028a2). It remains unclear whether this translation is a version of the *Metaphysics* different from the *Nova*, or just a different copy of this latter. In the case at hand, the *alia translatio* translates the Greek  $\lambda\omicron\iota\pi\acute{o}\nu$  as *alium*. This rendering is typical neither of the *Translatio Vetustissima* [see ARISTOTELES, *Metaph.* (Arist. Lat. 25/1–1<sup>a</sup>), 210a] nor of the *Translatio Media* [see ARISTOTELES, *Metaph.* (Arist. Lat. 25/2), 329b].
- 20 DONATI 2005, 262, portrays Adam's commentary as »a few years later« than Rufus', and dates it ca. 1250.
- 21 See above, n. 8. As to Adam's other sources, the beginning of his commentary on *Metaph.*  $\alpha$  (ADAM DE BUCKFIELD, *Sent. sup. sec. Metaph.*, ed. Maurer, 101, 5–8) might contain an explicit indeterminate reference (*alii*) to the MS Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Apost. Vatic., Vat. lat. 2081, fol. 140<sup>r</sup> (see MAURER 1955, 99 n. 5). The identity of the *quidam* mentioned by Adam in this same passage, as well as in a later passage of his exegesis of  $\alpha$  [ID., *ibid.* (106, 4)], remains, for the time being, uncertain.
- 22 ADAM DE BUCKFIELD, *Sent. sup. sec. Metaph.*, ed. Maurer. To the mss. used for this edition, MS Montpellier, Bib. Interuniv. (Sec. de méd.), H. 293, fol. 163<sup>ra</sup>–170<sup>va</sup> [on *Metaph.*  $\Gamma$ , 4

author relied on *LCM*: in about forty printed pages, Averroes (always named »Commentator«) is quoted explicitly more than fifty times.<sup>23</sup> Many implicit quotations are detectable as well. Significantly, Averroes' exegesis, rather than Aristotle's text, becomes sometimes the theme of the commentary: in some cases, Adam explains why Averroes has commented a certain passage in a certain way;<sup>24</sup> in other cases, he acknowledges that his own interpretation of Aristotle's text is different from Averroes'.<sup>25</sup> Also the exegesis of the other books appears to be equally dependent on Averroes, both explicitly and implicitly.<sup>26</sup> Thus, Adam's commentary results to be one of the main recipients of *LCM* in early Latin Aristotelianism.

Table 2 provides, from left to right, the synopsis of Averroes', Adam's and Albertus' exegesis of the beginning of *Metaphica* α. The table shows the way in which Adam and Albertus quoted *LCM*, and that Adam and Albertus had independent recourse to the text of Averroes. The left column reports the Latin version not only of Averroes' exegesis, but also, between square brackets, of the *lemmata* of the Arabic translation of the *Metaphysics* commented upon by Averroes. These *lemmata* constitute the Latin version of the *Metaphysics* called *Metaphysica Nova*, which was commented upon by Adam. The right column correspondingly reports, between square brackets, the Latin translation of the *Metaphysics* commented upon by Albertus, the so-called *Metaphysica Media*, made from Greek. In both cases, the *lemmata* are marked by the exponent »L«.

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(1008b12)–Δ, 22 (1022b27)] can be added (see DONATI 1998, 112 n. 2). Transcription of excerpts of MS Oxford, Balliol College 241 can be found in DONATI 2003, 34 n. 16, 44 n. 45; DONATI 2005, 262; MAURER 1950, 218; NOONE 1989, 79–80. The ascription to Adam of the commentary on the *Metaphysica Vetus* copied in the margin of the MS Firenze, Bib. Med. Lauren., Pl. XIII sin. 7, fol. 76<sup>r</sup>–91<sup>r</sup>, is regarded as doubtful by DONATI 1998, 112 n. 2.

23 Some of the explicit quotations regard Averroes' commentaries on other Aristotelian works (see, for example, ADAM DE BUCKFIELD, *Sent. sup. sec. Metaph.*, ed. Maurer, 105, 29–31).

24 See, for example, ADAM DE BUCKFIELD, *Sent. sup. sec. Metaph.*, ed. Maurer, 104, 23–25.

25 See, for example, ADAM DE BUCKFIELD, *Sent. sup. sec. Metaph.*, ed. Maurer, 109, 36–110, 9; 113, 10–11; 113, 34–38; 117, 14–23; 119, 27–35.

26 See, for example, the explicit quotations of the »Commentator« in the exegesis of *Metaph.* Γ, 7 (DONATI 2005, 262; cf. AVERROES, *Comm. Mag. Metaph.*, fol. 96M–97B) and Λ, 8 (NOONE 1989, 79–80), and the implicit adoption of Averroes' doctrine of *ens diminutum* in the exegesis of E, 4 (1027b33–1028a2) (MAURER 1950, 218). It is noteworthy that, in referring to the same passages of Averroes' *LCM* quoted also by Richard Rufus of Cornwall (see the synopsis in NOONE 1989, 79–80), Adam mentions Averroes (»dicit Commentator«, »ut dicit«, »declarat Commentator«) more frequently than Rufus (»dicit Commentator«).

Table 2

AVERROES, *Comm. Mag.*  
*Metaph.* α.1, fol. 28I-29A,  
ed. Darms, 53, 16–55, 3.

ADAM DE BUCKFIELD,  
*Sent. sup. sec. Metaph.*,  
ed. Maurer, 101.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS,  
*Metaph.* 1. 2, c. 1  
(Ed. Colon. 16/1), 91, 22–92, 21.

[1] Quia ista scientia perscrutatur de veritate simpliciter, incipit **notificare dispositionem** viae inducentis ad ipsam **secundum difficultatem et facilitatem**, cum sit **manifestum** apud omnes, quod comprehensio veritatis non est impossibile in multis rebus.

[a] Pars autem prooemialis dividitur in quatuor partes, quia, ut vult Commentator, **cognitio veritatis in multis rebus est manifesta** et possibilis. Propter hoc in principio huius libri **notificat dispositionem** venienti in cognitionem veritatis **secundum facilitatem et difficultatem**. [...]

[2] Credimus enim necessario nos scire veritatem in multis rebus. Et signum eius est hoc, quod habemus desiderium ad sciendum veritatem; quoniam si comprehensio esset impossibilis, tunc **desiderium** esset **otiosum**. Et concessum est ab omnibus, quia nulla res est otiosa in fundamento naturae et creaturae.

see below, [vi<sup>3</sup>]

[3<sup>1</sup>] [**Consideratio** quidem in **veritate** *difficilis est uno modo, facilis alio*]

[i<sup>1</sup>] [*De veritate theoria sic quidem est difficilis, sic vero facilis*]

[b] In parte prima sic procedit. Primo ponit conclusionem quam intendit,

[3] Quia igitur concessum est maxime a pervenientibus ad hanc scientiam, nos habere viam ad sciendum veritatem, dixit: **Consideratio quidem** etc. id est **via** quidem inducens veritatem uno modo est difficilis, alio modo facilis.

[c] dicens quod **consideratio de veritate**, sive **via ducens in veritatem, uno modo est difficilis** et **alio modo facilis**.

[i] Dicimus igitur, quod theoria sive contemplatio vel **consideratio de veritate** existens **uno modo est difficilis** et **alio modo facilis**.

[4<sup>1</sup>] [*Et signum eius est, quod nullus hominum potuit pervenire in ipsam secundum quod oportet plene*]

[ii<sup>1</sup>] [*Signum autem est eam digne nullum acquirere posse*]

[d] Secundo cum dicit *Et signum eius est*, **VERIFICAT EAM PER SIGNA**, ubi sic procedit:

[ii<sup>1</sup>] **HOC AUTEM PROBATUR PER SIGNUM** ex parte sui effectus sumptum.

[4] Et **signum difficultatis eius est**, quia **nullus sine** cognitione **alterius** scivit de ea aliquam quantitatem secundum quod oportet.

[5<sup>L</sup>] [*neque deviauit se ab hominibus omnibus*]

[5] Et **signum facilitatis** eius **est** hoc, **quod** non ignoraverunt eam **omnes** homines; quoniam si inveniremus omnes homines, de quibus audivimus loqui, **nihil** scire de veritate, tunc indicarem ipsam esse difficilem et impossibilem propter longitudinem temporis, quod est necessarium in sciendo veritatem, et quasi brevitatem temporis, in quo scita est veritas aut tota aut **aliqua quantitas**, indicat facilitatem eius.

[6<sup>L</sup>] [*sed unusquisque hominum locutus est de natura. Et unusquisque eorum nihil aut minimum comprehendit de veritate aut modicum*]

[6] D. d.: *Sed unusquisque locutus fuit in natura* etc. id est et diximus hoc quod diximus de modo comprehendendi veritatem, quia cum nos consideravimus **omnes antiquos** in scientiis, invenimus eos fuisse secundum alterum duorum: aut hominem, qui nihil **comprehendit** de veritate, aut hominem, qui **modicum comprehendit** de ea.

[7<sup>L</sup>] [*Cum igitur congregatum fuerit quod congregatum fuit ex eo ab omnibus qui comprehenderunt, tunc congregatum erit alicuius quantitatis*]

[e] Primo dat **signum difficultatis eius**. Et **est** quod **nullus** hominum **sine** adiutorio **alterius** potuit pervenire ad comprehensionem illius veritatis sufficienter;

[f] quod non est nisi propter suam difficultatem.

[g] Secundo cum dicit *Licet deviaerunt* [?], dat **signum facilitatis**. Et **est quod omnes antiqui** considerantes de veritate aliquid **comprehenderunt** de ipsa, licet **modicum**.

[ii<sup>2</sup>] **Signum** autem illud **est** quod **nullus** philosophorum digne, prout ipsa res exigit, numquam (eam) potuit acquirere inventionem vel doctrina vel doctrina simul et inventionem;

[ii<sup>3</sup>] hoc enim signum est, quod aliquo modo est difficilis.

[iii<sup>1</sup>] [*nec omnes fallere*]

[iii] Quod autem alio modo sit facilis, **signum est, quod nullus omnium** eorum qui consideraverunt in ea, omnino et universaliter fefellit ita, quod **nihil** veritatis participaret in ea [*in ea secludendum?*]; sed unusquisque aliquid dixit de natura eius; licet enim balbutiendo id dixerit, tamen ab ipsa manifesta veritate compulsus aliquid veritatis nisus est dicere.

[iv<sup>L</sup>] [*sed unumquemque aliquid de natura dicere, et secundum unum quidem nichil aut parum ei immiscere*]

[iv] Ulterius autem adhuc signum, quod secundum unum aliquem in ea considerantem aut nihil aut parum valde contingit immiscere de veritate ipsi sapientiae. Dico autem »nihil« propter modum, et »parum« propter dictum, quod dixit; modo enim aperto lucido nullus **antiquorum** aliquid dixit. Dixit tamen quilibet nitendo et conando aliquod dicere principiorum, et parum circa hoc dixit quod aliorum dictis coniungibile et commiscibile fuit ad sapientiae succrementum et augmentum.

[v<sup>L</sup>] [*ex omnibus autem coarticulatis fieri mensuram aliquam*]

[h] Et licet unusquisque ipso-  
rum modicum comprehendat de  
ipsa, tamen si conjunctum fuerit  
quod ab omnibus comprehen-  
ditur, erit tandem pervenire ad  
**aliquam quantitatem** suffici-  
entem in comprehensione ipsius.  
Unde consideratio de veritate se-  
cundum hunc modum facilis est.

[v] Signum vero ulterius facili-  
tatis est, quod ex omnium con-  
siderantium in veritate dictis  
simul coarticulatis fit **aliqua**  
notabilis sapientiae mensura  
**quantitatis**. Dico autem »ex  
dictis simul coarticulatis«, quia,  
sicut in antehabito libro dixi-  
mus, antiqui dicta sua non ar-  
ticulaverunt. Nos autem et ar-  
ticulabimus, quae balbutientes  
dixerunt, et coadminiculabimus  
in unum, quae sparsa et non  
**congregata** dixerunt; nec ex  
his coarticulatis proficiens fieret  
sapientiae mensura, nisi, sicut  
diximus, ab ipsa veritate, quae  
ultra se eis offerebat, compulsi  
multa vera dixissent.

[8<sup>1</sup>] [*Est igitur facilis secundum hunc  
modum, et est modus quem habemus in  
consuetudine inducere in proverbio  
dicendo, quod nullus ignoret locum  
ianuae in domo*],

[8.1] D. d.: *Est igitur facilis secun-  
dum hunc modum* etc. id est et cum  
positum est, quod est facilis se-  
cundum hunc modum et diffi-  
cilis secundum alium, necesse  
est, ut sit facilis secundum hunc  
modum. Et est quod in quolibet  
genere entium sunt aliqua in re-  
spectu eorum, quod ianua do-  
mus in respectu domus, in hoc  
quod non latent aliquem, sicut  
locus portae domus non latet ali-  
quem.

[8.2] Et ista sunt **prima** cognita  
habita naturaliter a nobis in  
quolibet genere entium.

[j] Et quod unusquisque anti-  
quorum modicum comprehen-  
dat de ipsa ostendit per  
quoddam SIMILE cum dicit *Et est  
modus*. Et est quod comprehensio  
antiquorum de veritate similis  
est ei quod communiter dicitur.  
Et est quod **nullus ignorat ja-  
nuam domus** eo quod omni-  
bus manifesta est; interiora au-  
tem domus et secreta, quae  
multo maiora sunt ipsa ianua,  
bene potest quis ignorare. Simi-  
liter, licet unusquisque antiquo-  
rum aliquid modicum compre-  
hendat de veritate, tamen nullus  
eorum sufficienter eam com-  
prehendit

[vi<sup>1</sup>] [*quare sic videtur habere, ut  
dicimus: in foribus quis delinquit?*]

[vi<sup>1</sup>] Huius autem SIMILE est,  
quod **in proverbio** vulgari so-  
lemus dicere: *In foribus quis delin-  
quit*, intendentes, quod in eo  
quod coram et pro foribus est,  
non est, qui in toto deviet, eo  
quod ab eo quod coram et pro  
foribus est, non est, qui in toto  
averti possit, eo quod etiam in  
caecum impingit seipsum, quod  
omnino coram et pro foribus  
esse probatur.

[vi<sup>2</sup>] Sic enim in omnibus quae  
considerantur, sunt quaedam  
**prima** principia coram et pro  
foribus, per quae aditus est ad  
alia, et in his non est aliquid  
errans et ignorans omnino. Prae-  
cipue tamen hoc est in commu-  
nissimis et primis, quae in hac  
sapientia considerantur. [...]

see above, [2]

[vi<sup>3</sup>] Hoc igitur modo quo pro foribus est ipsa veritas, facilis esse significatur, sed in hoc quod (est) non posse eam habere pro toto vel pro parte notabilis quantitatis, ostenditur quod est difficilis. Et ideo in superiori diximus libro, quod ista sapientia est de his quae difficile est homini cognoscere et quod possessio eius est non humana, sed divina et quod tamen non in toto effugit hominem, quia omnis homo naturaliter scire desiderat ipsam et non est inane desiderium. [...]

Adam quotes Averroes' text both explicitly (see the quotation of the »Commentator« in section [a]) and implicitly. Albertus' quotation, on the contrary, is totally implicit. Both Adam and Albertus follow, *grosso modo*, the order of the Averroes' text.

That Albertus has access to *LCM* independently from Adam is evident in two main respects. First, some parts of this work are quoted by Albertus, not by Adam, whereas other parts, quoted by Adam, are not quoted by Albertus. Thus, sections [2] and [8.2] are quoted by Albertus, not by Adam, whereas section [1] is quoted by Adam, not by Albertus. Second, of the sections of *LCM* quoted by both, sometimes Albertus reproduces terms that do not occur in Adam's commentary. This is the case of the terms *congregatum* in section [7<sup>L</sup>] of Averroes and section [v] of Albertus, and *proverbium* in section [8<sup>L</sup>] of Averroes and section [vi<sup>1</sup>] of Albertus. It is also the case of the locutions »secundum quod oportet« in section [4] of Averroes, corresponding to »prout ipsa res exigit« in section [ii<sup>2</sup>] of Albertus, and »nihil scire de veritate« in section [5] of Averroes, corresponding to »nihil veritatis participare« in section [iii] of Albertus.

Thus, in all likelihood Albertus takes this quotation of Averroes directly from *LCM*, not indirectly from Adam.<sup>27</sup>

27 A few points of Adam's commentary that do not depend on Averroes have a certain correspondence in Albertus. This is the case, first of all, of section [d], namely the remark that the following proof, taken from Averroes, is a proof *per signa*. Also the content of section [f] is similar in Adam and Albertus, even though there is no verbal correspondence between their statements. Finally, the term *simile* in section [j] recurs both in Adam and Albertus. These similarities, however, are very scanty and might well be coincidental. They are not so precise and frequent to make one think that Albertus' commentary depends on Adam's exegesis.



## § 3 Geoffrey of Aspoll (d. 1287)

A student of Adam of Buckfield, Geoffrey of Aspoll wrote his still unpublished commentary *per quaestiones* on the *Metaphysics* as master of arts in Oxford around 1260.<sup>28</sup> The commentary is based on books  $\alpha$ –I of the *Metaphysica Nova*, although some of the 12 introductive questions refer to the part of book A not contained in the *Nova*,<sup>29</sup> and some passages of the *Metaphysics* are mentioned according to other translations.<sup>30</sup> Formerly ascribed to Robert Kilwardby,<sup>31</sup> these questions depend on Kilwardby's works and, among others, on *LCM*.<sup>32</sup> The dependence on Averroes is underscored by the fact that, as in Richard Rufus' commentary, some *quaestiones* (l. 7, q. 42–43) regard propositions of the Commentator.<sup>33</sup> In lack of a published text, however, the extent of Geoffrey's recourse to *LCM* in this work cannot be assessed precisely.<sup>34</sup>

- 28 The commentary is preserved in MS Cambridge, Gonv. and Caius Coll., 509, 2, fol. 52<sup>ra</sup>–122<sup>rb</sup>. Outline of the Prologue, various excerpts, and *incipits* of the exegesis of the single books in GAL 1953. Edition of l. 1, q. 11, in ZIMMERMANN 1998, 34–36, and of l. 4, q. 21, in PLEVANO 1993, 227–232. *Incipits* of the exegesis of the single books and list of questions in ZIMMERMANN 1971, 13–14, 66–75. On Geoffrey's view of the subject-matter of metaphysics, see CALLUS 1963, 397–398; ZIMMERMANN 1998, 161–165. On his life and works, see PLEVANO 1993, 185–198.
- 29 Questions 2–4, for example, concern the *appetitus naturalis* of knowledge mentioned at the very beginning of *Metaph.* A (see ZIMMERMANN 1971, 66).
- 30 The quotation of *Metaph.*  $\Gamma$ , 8 (1012b17–18), at the end of l. 4, q. 21 (PLEVANO 1993, 232: »qui dicit omnia esse falsa, dicit seipsum esse falsum«), corresponds to the *Metaphysica Media* (»qui vero omnia falsa et seipsum«, ARISTOTELES, *Metaph.*, 1012b17–18 (Arist. Lat. 25/2), 82, 25) rather than to the *Nova*, which either omits or mistranslates this passage (see AVERROES, *Comm. Mag. Metaph.*, fol. 99C).
- 31 See GAL 1953, whose ascription to Kilwardby rests on the many doctrinal similarities between Geoffrey's commentary and Kilwardby's writings. Geoffrey's authorship was assessed by CALLUS 1963, 398. Gal's attribution is still endorsed by VAN STEENBERGHEN 1991, 125.
- 32 The dependence on Kilwardby's *De ortu scientiarum*, Commentary on the *Sentences*, and *De spiritu imaginativo*, is amply documented in GAL 1953. According to him, the author of the commentary »when exposing the text of the Philosopher, keeps constantly before his eyes the commentary of Averroes« (ibid., 27). Averroes is the first author mentioned in Gal's survey of the sources of the *quaestiones*. Many explicit indeterminate quotations remain to be identified (see, for example, the *magni* in GAL 1953, 15 n. 16, and the *quidam* in PLEVANO 1993, 228, 60).
- 33 »Dubitatur de propositione Commentatoris, quod circulus dicitur aequivoco [...] de circulo communi et de circulo particulari«, cf. AVERROES, *Comm. Mag. Metaph.* **Z**, 36, fol. 188E–F, on *Metaph.* **Z**, 10 (1036a19–23); »Dubitatur de propositione Commentatoris, quod principia (*lege*: particularia?) non habent nomen«, cf. AVERROES, *Comm. Mag. Metaph.* **Z**, 35, f. 187F–G, on *Metaph.* **Z**, 10 (1035b27–31) (see ZIMMERMANN 1991, 74).
- 34 Averroes is explicitly quoted neither in the *quaestio* about being as the subject-matter of metaphysics (l. 1, q. 11), edited by ZIMMERMANN 1998, 34–36, nor in the *quaestio* about the principle of non-contradiction (l. 4, q. 21), edited by PLEVANO 1993, 227–232.

Although, on purely chronological grounds, the possibility of Geoffrey's influence on Albertus cannot be excluded, the different formats of the two commentaries – *quaestiones* lacking a *sententia* in the case of Geoffrey, a paraphrase with digressions in the case of Albertus – make such an influence unlikely. Moreover, the fact that in the *quaestiones* on the *Metaphysics* Geoffrey quotes Albertus by name (»per Albertum, in principio de anima«),<sup>35</sup> as he does implicitly elsewhere,<sup>36</sup> in sign of respect and deference, seems to attest the dependence of the former upon the latter, rather than the opposite.

Even more, Albertus appears to be critical of Geoffrey. A passage of the proem of Albertus' commentary (chapter I 1 2) contains a criticism of some Latin philosophers about the doctrine of the subject matter of metaphysics. These philosophers are very likely contemporaries of Albertus, but their identity remains uncertain, since Albertus refers to them vaguely, as *quidam Latinorum* or by means of similar indeterminate expressions. The view criticized by Albertus can be found in two of Geoffrey's *quaestiones*, although it seems to be advanced also by other authors, like Roger Bacon.<sup>37</sup>

Table 3

ROBERT KILWARDBY, <i>Not. Super Lib. Periherm.</i> prooem., ed. Conti [forthcoming] <sup>38</sup>	GALFRIDUS DE ASPALL, <i>Quaest. super Metaph.</i> l. 1, q. 11–12 (in: ZIMMERMANN 1998, 35–36, 165).	ROGER BACON, <i>Quaest. alt. supra lib.</i> <i>prim. philos.</i> l. 3, q. 15 (Roger Bacon 1932, 121, 7–20)	ALBERTUS MAGNUS, <i>Metaph.</i> l. 1, tr. 1, c. 2 (Ed. Colon. 16/1), 5, 34–58.
	[l. 1, q. 11: Argument] Item [...] <b>prima</b> philoso- <b>phia</b> verissima erit de <b>pri-</b> <b>mo</b> et verissimo ente ut de <b>subiecto</b> . Nihil autem tale est nisi causa prima. Ergo causa prima est <b>subiec-</b> <b>tum primae philosophiae.</b> [...]		[i] Sunt autem quidam La- tinorum logice persuasi, di- centes deum esse <b>subiec-</b> <b>tum huius scientiae</b> , eo quod nobilissimae scientiae dicunt debere esse nobilissimum subiectum et <b>primae scien-</b> <b>tiae primum subiectum</b> et divinae divinum et altissimae altissimum;

35 See CALLUS 1963, 398; PLEVANO 1993, 195–196.

36 See the passage of Geoffrey's questions on the *De anima* mentioned by PLEVANO 1993, 196 and n. 103 (also in this case, the reference is to Albertus' *De anima*).

37 The tentative identification, in the *apparatus fontium* of the edition of Albertus' commentary (5 n. 34), of the *quidam Latinorum* with Robert Kilwardby (*De Ortu Scientiarum*) is not tenable, since in this work Kilwardby proposes a view of the subject-matter of metaphysics as being *qua* being (see ZIMMERMANN 1998, 224–228) that is quite different from the one of the *quidam Latinorum* (God is the subject-matter of metaphysics).

38 My sincere thanks to Prof. Alessandro Conti for having allowed me to consult a preliminary version of his edition. My gratitude goes also to Prof. Bruno Tremblay for having called to my attention and discussed with me this passage.

[I. 1, q. 11: Geoffrey's answer] Ad aliud dicendum, quod cum prima philosophia sit verissima, est de primo ente verissimo, ut de causa prima, non tamen ut de totali subiecto, sed de ipsa in qua stat et uniatur tota perscrutatio primae philosophiae.

Testatur enim Averroes quod est sumere eius [sc. primae philosophiae] **subiectum** dupliciter: aut id in quo communiant omnia illa de quibus est hic intentio, et hoc est **ens** universaliter; aut id de quo per se primo est intentio, et hoc est per se ens et primum ens, quod est substantia.

[I. 1, q. 11: Solutio] Ad hoc dicendum, quod est dicere **subiectum** duplex: Vel illud quod est aggregatum ex omnibus, de quibus determinatur. **Et hoc modo ens** simpliciter in quantum tale est subiectum. Unde posset dici, quod **ens** est subiectum communissimum, substantia autem est eius subiectum principale.

[I. 1, q. 12] Haec autem dicitur divina, quia de **Deo**, ideo tamquam *de potissimo et principali subiecto* (emphasis added)

[I. 1, q. 12] **Haec** autem dicitur **divina**, quia de Deo [...].

Ad tertiam rationem dicendum, quod **subiectum in metaphysica tripliciter dicitur**: Uno modo est subiectum in ipsa per participationem essentiae communis formalis, et hoc est hoc quod est **ens**, quod de omnibus praedicatur ...; **secundo** modo dicitur subiectum in metaphysica in ratione originis et radices, et hoc modo substantia, quae est radix et origo omnium eorum, quae sunt, et fundamentum ... **Tertio modo** dicitur subiectum in metaphysica tamquam a quo omnia et ad quod omnia reducuntur et procedunt, et hoc modo causa prima ...

[ii] et huiusmodi multa ponunt secundum logicas et communes convenientias, et hi<sup>39</sup> more Latinorum, qui omnem distinctionem solutionem esse reputant, dicentes **subiectum** tribus modis **dici in scientia**, scilicet quod communius subicitur aut quod certius aut quod in scientia dignius est. **Et primo modo** dicunt **ens** in ista subici scientia et **secundo causam** et **tertio modo deum**,

[iii] et **hanc** scientiam non a toto, sed a quadam sui parte dignissima **vocari divinam**.

[iv] Sed ego tales logicas convenientias in scientiis de rebus abhorreo, eo quod ad multos deducunt errores.

[v] Distinctionem etiam non approbo propter rationes in praehabitis inductas.

[vi] Nec denominatio ideo fit, quod divina dicitur [...].

39 et hi *ed.*: hi *P* (= MS Città del Vaticano, Bibl. Apost. Vatic., Pal. lat 977, fol. 2<sup>rb</sup>); this variant reading is not recorded in the *apparatus lectionum* of the edition.

Albertus seems to confront two distinct, albeit related, groups of Latin philosophers. The first group is the *quidam Latinorum* in section [i], who hold that God is the subject-matter of metaphysics, on account of four necessary correspondences between the science of metaphysics and its subject-matter (utmost nobility, priority, divinity, utmost height). The second group is the *hi more Latinorum [...] dicentes* in the following two sections, who posit a three-fold consideration of the subject-matter of a science, and accordingly contend that metaphysics has three subject-matters, namely *ens qua ens*, cause, and God (section [ii]), arguing that metaphysics receives its name of »divine science« by one of its parts, namely by the part in which its third subject-matter, God, is taken into account (section [iii]).<sup>40</sup> In the remaining three sections ([iv]–[vi]), Albertus rejects each of these three doctrines: the first doctrine contradicts the epistemological principle of the *Posterior Analytics* that every science must have only one subject-matter; the second doctrine goes against the lengthy discussion that Albertus has proposed in chapters I 1 1–2, meant to show that being *qua* being is the only subject-matter of metaphysics; the third doctrine, finally, conflicts with Albertus' view that metaphysics can be named *scientia divina* not on account of one of its parts, but on account of its entire scope, since being *qua* being, its subject-matter, is a divine reality according to the *Liber de Causis*.

Albertus' depiction of his adversaries' position in sections [i]–[iii] is mirrored in distinct passages of Geoffrey's questions 11 and 12 of the first book of the *Metaphysics*. First of all, in question 11 Geoffrey reports a view similar to the one that Albertus ascribes to the *quidam Latinorum* in section [i]. In his report, the argument contains one of the correspondences mentioned by Albertus: since metaphysics is the first science, its subject-matter must correspondingly be the first being, namely God. As a matter of fact, in the answer to this argument Geoffrey rejects this line of reasoning; he states that the first and truest being, God, is not the overall subject-matter of metaphysics, but the first cause investigated in it. However, his rejection of the argument is not absolute: by assigning to God, as First Cause, the function of bringing to unity all the metaphysical investigation, he ascribes to Him an epistemological status similar to that of the subject-matter. Moreover, by denying to God the status of *totale subiectum* of metaphysics, not of subject-matter without qualifications, he leaves open the possibility that God may function as a »partial«, so to say, subject-matter of this discipline (as, in fact, is the case in question 12).

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40 The link connecting these two groups of philosophers, according to Albertus, is methodological (an improper use of logical correspondences and distinctions within metaphysics) rather than thematic (God is the sole subject-matter of metaphysics, according to the former group; He is one of the three subject-matters of this discipline, according to the latter group).

Secondly, the position of three subject-matters of metaphysics, advanced by the *hi more Latinorum dicentes* in section [ii], is fragmentarily endorsed, *mutatis mutandis*, by Geoffrey in the *solutio* of question 11 and in question 12. In a case, he qualifies being *qua* being and substance as, respectively, *subiectum communissimum* and *subiectum principale*; later, he portrays God – in connection with, but also in distinction from, substance – as *subiectum potissimum et principale*. The distinction between a *subiectum commune* (being) and a *subiectum primum* (substance) of metaphysics can be found, ascribed to Averroes,<sup>41</sup> in Robert Kilwardby's (d. 1279) commentary on the *Peri hermeneias*, in support of an analogous distinction regarding the subject-matter of the logical discipline dealt with in the commentary.<sup>42</sup> A more encompassing position of three (rather than two) subject-matters of metaphysics (being, substance, First Cause), sharply distinguished from one another according to three different points of view, can be found in Roger Bacon's *quaestiones* on the *Metaphysics*.<sup>43</sup> In this regard, Geoffrey's view on the subject-matter of metaphysics is, typologically, intermediate between the two-fold scheme of Kilwardby and the three-fold format of Bacon. Although the *hi more Latinorum* [...] *dicentes*, reported by Albertus, assume a second subject-matter of metaphysics (cause) different from the one posited by Kilwardby, Geoffrey and Bacon (substance), the difference does not seem to be relevant: Roger Bacon, for example, makes clear that substance can be taken as subject-matter of metaphysics just because it is the origin (*origo*) and the foundation (*fundamentum*), namely the cause, of all other beings; Albertus makes clear, moreover, that he disagrees with the overall distinction itself, rather than with the specific items representing its elements.

41 This distinction does not appear, as such, in *LCM*. It rather looks like the result of the conflation of two distinct passages of this commentary, namely Γ, 1, fol. 64B (»Iste tractatus continet duas partes. Prima est in definiendo subiectum istius artis«) and Γ, 2, fol. 67K (»Cum declaravit, quod unius scientie est consideratio de ente et de causis suis, scilicet substantia, et de causis substantiae, vult declarare [...]«). The Latin translation of the second passage misreports the Arabic original text (»After having clarified that to a single science belongs the investigation of the existent in so far as it is existent, and that [this science] is the science investigating among them [i. e. among the existents] what is prior in existence, in so far as also the first reasons and causes of this latter are investigated (i. e. substance and the causes of substance), he wants to clarify etc.«

42 »Et sic est sumere huius [sc. scientiae libri Perihermeneias] subiectum dupliciter: aut id in quo communicant omnia ista de quibus est hic intentio, et hoc est interpretatio; aut id de quo per se et primo est hic intentio, et hoc est enuntiatio. Omnino consequitur ei quod dicitur in prima philosophia. Testatur enim Averroes etc.«

43 See ZIMMERMANN 1998, 158–159.

Finally, the denomination of metaphysics as »divine science«, on account of its dealing with God, is clearly advanced by Geoffrey in the same passage of question 12.

The precise target of Albertus' criticism, namely the identity of these two groups of Latin philosophers, is difficult to ascertain. As to the first group, no Latin author appears to have held that God is the sole subject-matter of metaphysics.<sup>44</sup> As to the second group, examples of similar distinctions of different subject-matters of metaphysics are attested in Latin philosophy, both before and after Albertus.<sup>45</sup> As to previous authors, Albertus does not seem to have in mind Robert Kilwardby, since he silently endorses the doctrine and reproduces the text of the aforementioned passage of Kilwardby's commentary on the *Peri hermeneias* in his own commentary on this work.<sup>46</sup> In general, Albertus does not appear to reject the possibility of referring to the existence of different subject-matters of metaphysics in order to clarify the epistemology of disciplines other than metaphysics, as Kilwardby does. Significantly, Albertus himself propounds a similar many-fold consideration of the subject-matter of metaphysics in works of logic, ethics and theology that both precede and follow the commentary on the *Metaphysics*.<sup>47</sup> If he dismisses so abruptly this possibility in the *Metaphysics* commentary, evidently it is because he reacts against a Latin author of a commentary on the *Metaphysics* who adopts this doctrine in order to elucidate the epistemological profile of metaphysics itself. This being the case, an animosity on his part against Geoffrey of Aspell or

44 No such opinion is reported in the fundamental study on this topic (ZIMMERMANN 1998).

45 Among the works taken into account in ZIMMERMANN 1998, the *quaestiones* on the *Metaphysics* of MS Cambridge, Peterhouse 152, fol. 293<sup>rb</sup>, also propound a two-fold view of the subject-matter of metaphysics (being; God), but are dependent on Albertus' commentary on the *Liber de Causis*, and hence very likely later than his commentary on the *Metaphysics* (see ZIMMERMANN 1998, 39, 81–89; 166 n. 31).

46 See ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Peri herm.* l. 1, tr. 1 (Ed. Paris. 1), 374a: »[...] sicut dicit Averroes, quod philosophia [prima] est de ente secundum quod est commune omni, sicut de communi subiecto ad quod reducuntur omnia quaecumque in scientia determinantur; et est de substantia sicut de speciali subiecto, de quo potissimum intenditur in scientia illa«.

47 See, in particular, ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Peri herm.* l. 1, tr. 1 (Ed. Paris. 1), 374a (the continuation of the passage referred to in the previous footnote): »Multipliciter enim datur alicui scientiae subiectum, et non uno modo: scilicet quod subiectum est de cuius partibus in scientia probantur passionēs; vel quod potissimum intenditur, propter quod de omnibus aliis determinatur in scientia; et dicitur subiectum quod dignissimum est inter ea de quibus tractat scientia, sicut metaphysica dicitur theologia, quia in dignissima sua parte tractat de divinis«. See also ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Super Ethica* prol. sol. (Ed. Colon. 14/1), 3, 54–80, and ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Summa I* tr. 1, q. 3, c. 1 (Ed. Colon. 34/1), 10, 65–89 (whereas the *Super Ethica* precedes the commentary on the *Metaphysics*, the *Summa theologiae* was written afterwards).

Roger Bacon is more likely.<sup>48</sup> Albertus regards the error of the *hi more Latinorum* [...] *dicentes* as particularly dangerous, in so far as it breaks the consensus of all the Peripatetics (including, as it seems, not only Avicenna but also Averroes) on being *qua* being as the only subject-matter of metaphysics.<sup>49</sup>

Leaving to future research the task of assessing conclusively the identity of Albertus' adversaries in the passage at hand, it can be confidently maintained that Albertus did and could not depend on authors, like Geoffrey of Aspill and Roger Bacon, who witness and, at least partially, endorse a view that Albertus so decidedly rejects.

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The same verb *abhorre* that we have met in Table 3 [iv], is used by Albertus also against some *doctores Latini* in his commentary on the *De anima*.<sup>50</sup> This *horror* towards the *Latini* reveals distaste for contemporary Latin interpretations of Aristotle, and is just the counterpart of Albertus' deep and extensive reception of Arabic Aristotelian philosophy. As an example of Albertus' attitude towards Arabic sources, the present paper has tried to show that his

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48 If the identification of Albertus' adversaries with Geoffrey of Aspill and Roger Bacon is correct, it remains undecided whether Albertus opposes only one of them or both. The possibility remains that Albertus is targeting, rather than Geoffrey and/or Roger themselves, some still unknown sources or followers of their position.

49 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Summa I* tr. 1, q. 1, c. 2 (Ed. Colon. 34/1), 4, 51–53: »Ideo cum omnibus Peripateticis vera dicentibus dicendum videtur, quod ens est subiectum in quantum ens«. In ascribing to Averroes this view of the subject-matter of metaphysics, Albertus probably relies on passages of *LCM* like B, 1, fol. 36M, and Γ, 5, fol. 70I. In fact, Averroes' doctrine of the subject-matter of metaphysics is more articulated; see BERTOLACCI 2007, 84–96, and PICKAVÉ 2007, 94–99. When, in the commentary on the *Peri hermeneias*, Albertus refers to Averroes' distinction between two subject-matters of metaphysics (being and substance; see above, n. 46), he simply reproduces Kilwardby's ascription of this doctrine to Averroes (on the dependence on Albertus' commentary on the *Peri hermeneias* on Kilwardby's, see EBBESEN 1981).

50 ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *De anima* l. 3, tr. 2, c. 1 (Ed. Colon. 7/1), 177, 59–63. On this passage, see WÉBER 1991, 121–123, 348, n. 452; TRACEY 2006 convincingly argues that in this passage Albertus is facing some specific Latin interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine of the potential intellect in the *De anima*, rather than the anthropological views of a trend of Latin theologians trying to reconcile Augustine with Avicenna. In Albertus' commentary on the *De anima*, all the other mentions of Latin thinkers (*quidam Latinorum philosophorum; Latinorum philosophorum plurimi; omnes moderni Latinorum*) regard errors imputed to these latter [*ibid.* l. 1, tr. 2, c. 15 (58, 48–49); l. 3, tr. 2, c. 11 (191, 54–55); l. 3, tr. 3, c. 10 (220, 50)]. In the first case, the *apparatus fontium* (58, ad 48–49) identifies the authors mentioned by Albertus with (pseudo)Peter of Spain (the author of the *Expositio libri de anima*), Adam of Buckfield, Geoffrey of Aspill, and Richard Rufus of Cornwall.

endorsement of Averroes' metaphysics is direct, in the sense of not being mediated by any Latin previous reception of it, and is integral, in the sense that Albertus preserves the integrity of this tradition against its adaptations and deformation by later authors. Albertus quotes Averroes' Long Commentary on the *Metaphysics* first-hand, without relying on previous authors, like Richard Rufus and Adam of Buckfield, largely indebted to Averroes. He also sharply dismisses opinions on fundamental tenets of the *Metaphysics*, like its subject-matter, as those professed by authors like Roger Bacon and Geoffrey of Aspull, that go against, in his opinion, Averroes and the other main exponents of Arabic Peripatetic metaphysics.



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## Abstract

Unter den Autoren, die Albert der Große in seinem Kommentar der aristotelischen Metaphysik berücksichtigt, kommt Averroes eine besondere Bedeutung zu. Dass Albert den *Großen Metaphysikkommentar* des Averroes kannte, steht außer Frage. In welcher Weise er ihn rezipierte, ob direkt oder aufgrund einer indirekten Vermittlung durch andere lateinische Autoren, bedarf der Erörterung. Amos Bertolacci geht dieser Frage im Einzelnen nach und kann im Ergebnis zeigen, dass die Metaphysikkommentare des Richard Rufus von Cornwall, des Adam von Bocfeld (of Buckfield), des Geoffrey von Aspall und des Roger Bacon, die chronologisch dem Werk Alberts vorausgehen oder zeitgleich zu diesem entstanden sind und welche Albert offensichtlich kannte, nicht die Quelle von Alberts Averroes Rezeption sein können. Wie Bertolacci im Vergleich der genannten Metaphysikkommentare mit dem des Albert zeigt, ist der *Große Metaphysikkommentar* des Averroes für Albert unmittelbar zugänglich und wird von ihm mit der gleichen Eigenständigkeit rezipiert, mit der Albert auch von Schriften seiner lateinischen Vorgänger Gebrauch macht.

Among the authors whom Albert the Great considers in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Averroes is accorded special importance. That Albert knew Averroes' *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* is beyond doubt. The way in which he received it – whether directly or by means of an indirect mediation through other Latin authors – requires discussion. Amos Bertolacci treats this question in detail and is ultimately able to demonstrate that the *Metaphysics* commentaries of Richard Rufus of Cornwall, Adam of Buckfield, Geoffrey of Aspall and Roger Bacon, which either came chronologically before Albert's work or were contemporaneous to it and which Albert obviously knew, cannot have been the sources for Albert's reception of Averroes. Through the comparison of the aforementioned commentaries on the *Metaphysics* with Albert's own, Bertolacci shows that Albert has direct access to Averroes' *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* and he interprets it with the same independence that he displays in his use of works by his Latin predecessors.

Parmi les auteurs qu'Albert le Grand prend en compte dans son commentaire de la métaphysique d'Aristote, Averroès tient un rôle principal. Il est hors de doute qu'Albert connaissait son *Grand commentaire de la métaphysique*. Mais il n'est pas encore clair, de quelle façon il l'a reçu : soit directement ou indirectement par l'intermédiaire d'autres auteurs latins. Amos Bertolacci explore cette question en détail et est finalement capable de montrer que les commentaires de la métaphysique de Richard Rufus de Cornouailles, d'Adam de Bocfeld, de Geoffrey de Aspall et de Roger Bacon qui précèdent chronologiquement l'œuvre d'Albert ou ont été écrits simultanément, et qu'Albert connaît de toute évidence, ne peuvent être la source de la réception d'Averroès par Albert. Une comparaison des commentaires de la métaphysique mentionnés avec celui d'Albert prouve plutôt qu'Albert a eu un accès direct au *Grand commentaire de la métaphysique* d'Averroès et qu'il l'interprète avec la même originalité qu'il utilise les écrits de ses prédécesseurs latins.